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ARTICLES 
Citizens of the State 
Maeve Glass† 
According to conventional wisdom, state citizenship emerged out of the local-
ism of early America and gave way to national citizenship with the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article offers a different account of state citizen-
ship and, with it, new resources for analyzing the Constitution. It argues that far 
from a primordial category that receded into irrelevance, state citizenship provided 
a crucial strategic tool in America’s antislavery movement, as abolitionist lawyers 
used the label of state citizenship to build a coalition with white elites by reframing 
the issue of slavery from the rights of a black person to the sovereignty of a state. 
In particular, beginning in the mid-1830s, abolitionist lawyers in Boston who 
confronted the limits of inherited arguments based on national citizenship turned to 
the Constitution’s clause guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of state citi-
zenship. By pairing this Article IV clause with the then-prevailing norm of a state’s 
sovereign duty to protect its citizens, these lawyers argued that failure on the part of 
Massachusetts to intervene in the police laws of the southern coastal states targeting 
free blacks would imperil the state’s beleaguered standing. These arguments in turn 
became the basis for the country’s first challenge to the laws of the southern states 
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that stripped black men of their liberty without due process, as lawmakers in Boston 
organized an Article IV lawsuit with the aim of vindicating the state’s coequal sov-
ereign status. Propelled by this convergence of interests, state citizenship remained 
a distinct status for the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment who envisioned that 
states would continue to play a role in the protection of individual rights. 
By excavating this neglected history, this Article reveals a constitutional ter-
rain defined not by a feuding North and South, but by an ever-shifting number of 
jurisdictions, bound in a domestic economy rooted in race-based slavery. At the same 
time, this Article unearths a robust precedent for current state initiatives to extend 
protections to individuals denied national citizenship. In doing so, it offers a more 
expansive definition of state sovereignty: one premised not simply on a state’s auton-
omy from the national government, but also on a state’s duty to protect its citizens. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of a New England winter long ago, young people 
of Boston filed into a drafty meeting hall up the road from the 
harbor.1 They had assembled on that January morning in 1839 
for the seventh annual meeting of the New England Anti-Slavery 
Society.2 As they took their seats in anticipation of the day’s 
proceedings—boots rumbling on the floorboards, sticks drum-
ming on the pews—those at the podium began to speak out 
against the police laws of the southern states that stripped black 
men of their liberty without due process.3 In time, these antislav-
ery lawyers and activists would be remembered as northerners 
 
 1 See Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, Emancipator (Jan 31, 1839). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. See also Report on the Deliverance of Citizens, Liable to Be Sold as Slaves, Mass 
HR Rep No 38, 60th Sess 9–12 (1839) (listing the police laws in question); Michael 
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who sought to secure the promise of national citizenship for free 
blacks.4 And yet that winter, these activists whose words and deeds 
would later inform the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment5 
looked beyond the language of national citizenship. Instead, they 
referred to the black men of Boston who had been lost to the pris-
ons and chain gangs of the plantation coast not as citizens of 
America, nor as fellow children of an almighty God, but as citizens 
of the sovereign state of Massachusetts.6 
In the generations since these members of America’s antislav-
ery movement seized on the State Citizenship Clause of Article IV7 
to launch what soon became one of the country’s earliest and most 
 
Schoeppner, Peculiar Quarantines: The Seamen Acts and Regulatory Authority in the 
Antebellum South, 31 L & Hist Rev 559, 563–86 (2013) (tracing the origins and functions 
of the police laws in the southern states). 
 4 See, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, New Viewpoints in American History 230 
(Macmillan 1922) (describing the emergence of an antislavery movement that looked to 
the national government to protect free blacks); Chester James Antieau, Paul’s Perverted 
Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 
Wm & Mary L Rev 1, 25 (1967) (arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was 
the “prime recognition of national citizenship”); Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights North and 
South in Antebellum America, in Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely Jr, eds, An Uncertain 
Tradition: Constitutionalism and the History of the South 125, 146 (Georgia 1989) (identi-
fying the emergence of an antislavery nationalism in the North that easily jettisoned ideas 
of state sovereignty); Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 Nw U L Rev 61, 96 
(2011) (“[A]ntislavery Americans increasingly asserted that free blacks were citizens of 
the United States.”); Thomas H. Burrell, Privileges and Immunities and the Journey from 
the Articles of Confederation to the United States Constitution: Courts on National Citizen-
ship and Antidiscrimination, 35 Whittier L Rev 199, 277 (2014) (arguing that antislavery 
activists used Article IV to argue for national citizenship for free blacks); Elizabeth 
Beaumont, The Civic Constitution: Civic Visions and Struggles in the Path toward Consti-
tutional Democracy 134–36 (Oxford 2014) (arguing that antislavery activists sought to 
create national citizenship for free blacks). 
 5 See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan L Rev 5, 22 (1949) (describing the campaign 
as a “stock example” during the debates of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alfred Avins, ed, 
The Reconstruction Amendments’ Debates: The Legislative History and Contemporary De-
bates in Congress on the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments 748 (Virginia Commission on 
Constitutional Government 1967) (listing thirteen references to the campaign during the 
Fourteenth Amendment debates); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction 236 (Yale 1998) (arguing that the history of this failed campaign “burned 
bright in the memories of members of Congress, who repeatedly cited the incident”). 
 6 Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, Emancipator (cited in note 1). See also Mass 
HR Rep No 38 at 6–7 (cited in note 3) (challenging the laws of the southern states as 
violations of the State Citizenship Clause). 
 7 See US Const Art IV, § 2, cl 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). Although scholars have tra-
ditionally referred to this clause as the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Comity 
Clause, I refer to it as the State Citizenship Clause, in recognition of the significance that 
antebellum legal actors placed on its opening phrase of state citizenship. 
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prominent legal challenges to a state’s deprivation of liberty with-
out due process—a challenge whose failure to reach federal court 
in turn became a catalyst for the Fourteenth Amendment—our 
understanding of how, why, and to what ends they did so has re-
mained hazy at best. Owing in part to a tendency within the aca-
demic literature to focus on the creation of national citizenship in 
the Fourteenth Amendment,8 we have only begun to explore the 
long history of state citizenship that preceded the amendment. 
Working from the familiar assumption that concepts of national 
citizenship were at best vague and even nonexistent prior to the 
march of Lincoln’s armies in the Civil War,9 the most prominent 
explanation holds that antislavery lawyers enlisted the aid of the 
State Citizenship Clause as part of a more general effort to create 
national citizenship for free blacks.10 
 
 8 See, for example, Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 
103 (Princeton 1924) (“The opening clause of [the Fourteenth Amendment] makes national 
citizenship primary and State citizenship derivative therefrom.”); James H. Kettner, The 
Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870 349 (North Carolina 1978) (noting that 
“as a consequence of the Union’s victory . . . there was no longer any doubt that national 
citizenship was primary”); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 
1863–1877 258 (Harper & Row 1988) (“In establishing the primacy of a national citizenship 
. . . Republicans carried forward the state-building process born of the Civil War.”); Bruce 
Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 198 (Belknap 1998) (“[T]he opening words of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” declared “the primacy of national citizenship and treat[ed] 
state citizenship as derivative.”); Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 
381 (Random House 2006) (“The Fourteenth Amendment made clear that all Americans 
were in fact citizens of the nation first and foremost, with a status and set of birthrights 
explicitly affirmed in a national Constitution.”). 
 9 See, for example, William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in 
Nineteenth-Century America, in Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer, 
eds, The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History 85, 92 
(Princeton 2003) (arguing that national citizenship did not exist as a salient category in 
antebellum America); Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Cre-
ation of the American Union, 1774–1804 2 (Virginia 2009) (“[A]nyone who called for a 
strong national state or encouraged a national standard for American citizenship dis-
sented from the common view.”); Ariela J. Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell: A History of Race 
on Trial in America 7 (Harvard 2008) (“Before the Civil War one could be a citizen of one’s 
home state, but there was no such thing as national citizenship.”); H. Robert Baker, The 
Fugitive Slave Clause and the Antebellum Constitution, 30 L & Hist Rev 1133, 1142 (2012) 
(“[T]he paramount authority for determining what privileges, protections, and restrictions 
belonged to each person [in the antebellum era] was the sovereign state.”); Kunal Parker, 
Making Foreigners: Immigration and Citizenship Law in America, 1600–2000 65 
(Cambridge 2015) (“Because of the limited powers of the federal government [in the ante-
bellum era], however, states played a relatively greater role in shaping immigration policy 
through the shaping of alien legal disabilities.”); Nicholas Guyatt, Bind Us Apart: How 
Enlightened Americans Invented Racial Segregation 71 (Basic Books 2016) (“Until ratifi-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the Constitution envisaged that Americans would 
become citizens through the laws of the state in which they were born or naturalized.”). 
 10 See note 8. 
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This Article offers a different explanation for the prominence 
of state citizenship in America’s antislavery movement, and 
with it, a new set of tools for analyzing the past and present of 
America’s Constitution. Drawing on extensive archival research, 
it argues that in the decades prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the lawyers who seized on the State Citizenship Clause of Article IV 
did so not with the primary aim of creating national citizenship 
for free blacks, as is often presumed. Rather, they did so as part 
of a successful effort to build an antislavery coalition by reframing 
the issue of American slavery from the rights of a black person to 
the sovereignty of a free state. 
In particular, these records reveal that the abolitionist law-
yers who began to construct a legal challenge to the police laws of 
the southern states using the State Citizenship Clause did so at 
a moment of crisis in the antislavery movement: a time when in-
herited arguments premised on the natural rights of black people 
as Americans had proven ill suited for a North defined by deep 
racism and vast investments in southern slavery. Confronted 
with the imminent collapse of their faltering movement, a small 
group of commercially trained lawyers developed a new strategy, 
based on the State Citizenship Clause of Article IV—a clause that 
until then had primarily been used in private law practice to keep 
the cargo ships in motion along the nation’s central shipping high-
way that connected the shipyards of Boston to the wharves of New 
Orleans. By pairing this clause with a government’s widely rec-
ognized sovereign duty to protect its citizens, these lawyers ar-
gued that the failure of Massachusetts to challenge the southern 
policing of the free black men who worked Boston’s cargo ships 
would constitute an abdication of the state’s sovereign status—
and thus, the unraveling of one of the world’s oldest experiments 
in constitutional governance.11 
 
 11 For background on the history and significance of the Massachusetts Constitution, 
see Ronald M. Peters Jr, The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact 13 
(Massachusetts 1978) (arguing that the Massachusetts Constitution “was among the first 
written constitutions in the world, was the first written constitution ever based upon the 
fully developed concept of a constitutional convention, and was the first written constitu-
tion ever expressly approved by the people over whom it was to operate”). See also 
Lawrence M. Friedman and Lynnea Thody, The Massachusetts State Constitution 3 
(Oxford 2011) (“Constitutional rule in America, in its earliest forms, began with the uses 
to which residents of Massachusetts put the Bay Colony’s royal charter of 1629, and the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 remains the oldest functioning written constitution 
in the world.”). 
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Far from receding under the shadow of national citizenship, 
these state-citizenship arguments quickly ascended into the 
mainstream of constitutional discourse. Troubled by the waning 
commercial power of Boston on a continent of highly volatile ter-
ritorial borders and the debris of fallen empires, Massachusetts 
lawmakers appropriated these state-centric arguments following 
a series of dramatic shifts in the constitutional terrain in the early 
1840s. Most notably, in the wake of the US Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV in Prigg v 
Pennsylvania,12 these lawmakers organized a corollary lawsuit 
based on the State Citizenship Clause with hopes of vindicating the 
state’s coequal status in the highly visible forum of the Supreme 
Court. Unwilling to jeopardize New England’s trade partnerships 
with the plantation South, however, these elites rejected the abo-
litionists’ recommendations to resort to arms when the legisla-
tures of South Carolina and Louisiana refused to allow this liti-
gation to proceed. Instead, borrowing from a model of 
international dispute resolution first codified in the Alien Tort 
Statute of 1789,13 these lawmakers made clear that in America’s 
slave-based economy, a state would fulfill its sovereign duty of 
protection to its citizens not on the battlefield but through state-
sponsored litigation in federal court. 
In lieu of disappearing in the nation-building moment of the 
Civil War, this conception of state citizenship and its corollary 
sovereign duty of protection forged the collective memory against 
which the nation’s lawmakers began to draft the Fourteenth 
Amendment following the uncertain end to American slavery. As 
Part III argues, when these lawmakers assembled in Washington 
to begin constructing the laws for a new republic, they routinely 
cited the history that lies at the heart of this Article: a history not 
of northern abolitionists steadily building toward a regime of na-
tional citizenship, but rather of a state whose agents had en-
deavored to use the federal courts to protect the rights of those 
precluded from national citizenship. Working from this shared, 
now-forgotten legacy of America’s age of slavery, these lawmakers 
who hammered the category of state citizenship into the Fourteenth 
Amendment did so with the expectation that at a time of immense 
brutality and logistical constraints on federal power, the state 
 
 12 41 US (16 Pet) 539 (1842). 
 13 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat 73, 76–77, codified as amended at 28 USC § 1350. 
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governments of America would continue to fulfill their sovereign 
duty to protect the rights of their citizens. 
This account of the rise of state citizenship from the meeting 
halls of Boston to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
broad implications for how we think about the past and present 
of America’s Constitution. First, this work challenges the long-
standing preoccupation with national citizenship as the dominant 
vehicle for safeguarding individual rights in America. Building on 
earlier accounts that have recognized the role of the states in 
rights protection,14 this work allows us to see the tragic intricacies 
of how and why this role emerged: not only through the formal 
processes of amending state constitutions to create positive 
rights,15 but also through the daily challenges of grassroots organ-
izing and the geopolitical struggles for power. By examining why 
state citizenship became the means by which disillusioned activ-
ists sought to secure the support of commercial elites—and by 
which these elites, in turn, endeavored to preserve their power 
through the courts—this work provides an early example of what 
constitutional scholar Derrick Bell identified as the convergence 
of interests that enabled racial desegregation in the 1950s.16 
Methodologically, this work builds on ongoing scholarly ef-
forts to move beyond the conventional binaries that have long 
held center stage in the study of American federalism.17 While 
 
 14 See, for example, William J. Brennan Jr, State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 Harv L Rev 489, 491 (1977) (“State constitutions [ ] are a font of 
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”); Emily J. Zackin, Looking for Rights in 
All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain America’s Positive Rights 24–27 
(Princeton 2013) (attributing the robust tradition of rights protection by the states to the 
relative ease of convening state constitutional conventions and amending state constitu-
tions). For a thorough account of the duties of protection owed by a government to its 
citizens upon which this Article builds, see generally Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and 
Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 
1992 S Ct Rev 295. Note that, like Professor Philip A. Hamburger, I read the historical 
sources to mean that antebellum Americans understood the state’s duty of protection to 
be a moral obligation, not a legally enforceable right. Id at 300 n 12. For a different inter-
pretation, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L J 507, 546 (1991). 
 15 See Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places at 24–27 (cited in note 14) 
(emphasizing the amendment process as the source of positive rights). 
 16 See Derrick A. Bell Jr, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 Harv L Rev 518, 524 (1980). I thank Jessica Bulman-Pozen for first suggest-
ing this link. 
 17 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U Pa L Rev 377, 381 (2018) 
(noting federalism’s conventional focus on the polarity of “State and National Govern-
ment”); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 
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these efforts have tended to focus on expanding the units of 
analysis outward to include transnational networks and inter-
state regions, or downward to include ever-smaller units of local 
governance,18 this Article invites scholars to take the further step 
of studying the actual construction of the states themselves.19 By 
 
Yale L J 619, 620 (2001) (arguing that the “quaint tidiness” of federalism’s analytical cat-
egories of nation and state “ought to prompt skepticism”). 
 18 See, for example, Resnik, 111 Yale L J at 623 (cited in note 17) (proposing a model 
of “multi-faceted federalism”); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan L Rev 
1745, 1748 (2005) (proposing a model of federalism that encompasses substate entities of 
local governance); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Fed-
eralism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 Emory 
L J 31, 34 (2007) (proposing a model of federalism that encompasses translocal organiza-
tions); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 Harv L Rev 4, 8 (2010) (proposing a model of federalism that encompasses 
substate entities); Bulman-Pozen, 166 U Pa L Rev at 380–82 (cited in note 17) (expanding 
the law’s focus on nation and state to include regionalism). 
 19 This Article’s model of inquiry is constructed using an array of theoretical and 
substantive insights from scholars outside the field of American constitutional history. 
First, borrowing from the pioneering work of Professor Carlos Sempat Assadourian, an 
economic historian of colonial Latin America, this model begins by setting aside the formal 
spatial and temporal units of analysis that have long defined the study of American con-
stitutional history and by instead examining the “economic spaces” that defined the move-
ment of capital and goods between zones of production and the market. See generally 
Carlos Sempat Assadourian, El Sistema de la Economía Colonial: El Mercado Interior, 
Regiones y Espacio Económico (Editorial Nueva Imagen 1983). Rather than mapping these 
economic spaces for what they can tell us about American commercial development, how-
ever, this model of inquiry then examines the legal customs and rules that governed these 
spaces, taking inspiration from legal historians who have encouraged us to see the law 
and its discourses not as a fixed object, but as a work of construction. See generally, for 
example, Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to 
Us All,” in David Thelen, ed, The Constitution and American Life 353 (Cornell 1988). See 
also, for example, Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transfor-
mation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830 7 n 27 (North Carolina 
2005). To examine this work of construction, this model of inquiry begins with the assump-
tion, borrowed from the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, that actors within any given field of 
social activity operate within the inherited structures of law and entrenched habitual cus-
toms. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford 1990) (Richard Nice, 
trans). This phase of analysis thus draws upon methodological insights from law-and-
society scholars to recover the interplay between background rules of law and unwritten 
customs. See generally, for example, Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am Sociological Rev 55 (1963); Sally Falk Moore, Law 
and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 
7 L & Society Rev 719 (1973). In addition to these theoretical insights, this model of inquiry 
also relies on substantive insights from recent scholarship in the fields of borderlands 
studies, the “new” history of American capitalism, and the Atlantic world that, when 
pieced together, have complicated the conventional sectional map of American antebellum 
history. See generally, for example, Kathleen DuVal, Debating Identity, Sovereignty, and 
Civilization: The Arkansas Valley after the Louisiana Purchase, 26 J Early Republic 25 
(2006); Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (Yale 2008); Juliana Barr, Geographies 
of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the “Borderlands” of the Early Southwest, 68 Wm & 
Mary Q 5 (2011); Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton 
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examining the particular historical context in which legal actors 
fashioned and deployed the rules governing the rights and duties 
of states, this approach in turn renders the construction of the 
states more legible, thereby denaturalizing an entity all too often 
presumed to be a primordial artifact of early American localism.20 
At the same time, this vantage point invites us to move beyond 
the familiar federalism lens that features a vertical contest be-
tween the nation and the states as static entities.21 Instead, it al-
lows us to see federalism as a horizontal contest between the 
states, whose agents assembled in the institutions of the nation’s 
capital and whose rights, duties, and territorial borders remained 
constantly in flux. 
More substantively, this shift in how we view the map of 
American constitutional history yields a deeper understanding of 
some of the most familiar cases in American constitutional law. 
On the one hand, recovering the material conditions that gave 
rise to state citizenship as a strategic tool in the 1830s allows us 
to read landmark cases, such as McCulloch v Maryland22 and 
Gibbons v Ogden,23 not simply as the triumphant rise of judicial 
nationalism, but also as an attempt to keep the ships of commerce 
in motion by instituting equal limits on the continent’s erupting 
 
Kingdom (Belknap 2013); Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, eds, Contested Spaces 
of Early America (Pennsylvania 2014); Brian Rouleau, With Sails Whitening Every Sea: 
Mariners and the Making of an American Maritime Empire (Cornell 2014); Michael A. 
McDonnell, Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America (Hill and 
Wang 2015); Calvin Schermerhorn, The Business of Slavery and the Rise of American Cap-
italism, 1815–1860 (Yale 2015); Steven Hahn, A Nation without Borders: The United 
States and Its World in an Age of Civil Wars, 1830–1910 (Viking 2016); Matthew Karp, 
This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy (Harvard 
2016); Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman, eds, Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of 
American Economic Development (Pennsylvania 2016). 
 20 I am grateful to Hendrik Hartog for suggesting the language of primordial states 
and to Lael Weinberger for suggesting the language of legibility and denaturalization. 
Note that by examining the construction of categories embedded within the federal 
Constitution, this approach also seeks to respond to recent calls for legal historians to 
broaden the conventional focus on the construction of race, gender, and class that has long 
defined the research agenda of civil-rights history. See Kenneth W. Mack, Civil Rights 
History: The Old and the New, 126 Harv L Rev F 258, 261 (2013). 
 21 See, for example, Jack Rakove, The Legacy of the Articles of Confederation, 12 
Publius 45, 49 (Autumn 1982) (“For the constitutional theorist, the critical issue in the 
creation of any federal system is the division of power between central authority and con-
stituent units.”); Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long 
Founding Moment, 67 Stan L Rev 397, 400–01 (2015) (“The central issue [in the early 
nineteenth century] was the proper scope of Congress’s power in relation to the states in 
the federal system.”). 
 22 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
 23 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). 
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jurisdictions.24 At the same time, understanding early American 
federalism as a contest between the various states on the conti-
nent reveals a long-hidden link between two of the country’s most 
infamous cases: the search for a rule of state equality that began 
with Justice Joseph Story’s interpretation of Article IV in Prigg 
and that ended with Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion in Dred 
Scott v Sandford,25 a decision that effectively foreclosed a rule of 
coequal Article IV obligations among the states.26 
Beyond enriching our understanding of these canonical deci-
sions, this work also offers us a more expansive conception of 
state sovereignty with which to work through open questions in 
American federalism today.27 As the second half of Part III ar-
gues, owing to the dominance of the conventional map of American 
constitutional history featuring a nationalist North facing off 
against a states’-rights South, the Supreme Court and its observ-
ers have had to make do with cramped notions of state sover-
eignty defined by a state’s degree of formal autonomy from the 
national government. By recovering an alternative conception of 
state sovereignty as one premised on a state’s duty to protect its 
citizens, this work provides a different way of approaching a 
range of doctrinal questions, as well as a historical precedent for 
several state initiatives now underway.28 
In the end, this analysis provides a means of venturing be-
yond the analytical categories that have long defined the study of 
American federalism. It invites us to follow in the footsteps of 
young, ambitious lawyers who set out to challenge the laws of dis-
crimination using an invented language of persuasion—a lan-
guage premised on a category of state citizenship that, in turn, 
had the potential to change the conversation from one of injustice 
to one of power. Today, the story of how they accomplished this 
feat serves as both a case study in successful constitutional inno-
vation, as well as a cautionary tale of how ideas travel through 
the realm of civil society and into the text of the Constitution—
reminding us of the cost of pursuing legal arguments that may 
 
 24 See notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
 25 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857). 
 26 See notes 254–56 and accompanying text. 
 27 See Part III.B. 
 28 See Part III.B. I thank Matthew Shapiro for first suggesting the possibility of 
using this historical analysis to expand current definitions of state sovereignty. 
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well prevail in gaining the attention of the powerful at the ex-
pense of the people.29 
Part I begins by reconstructing the historical context in 
which America’s antislavery activists first began to experiment 
with the State Citizenship Clause of Article IV. Part II then shifts 
to the legislature of Massachusetts, the self-proclaimed leading 
state of the Union, where a cohort of politicians appropriated 
these state-citizenship arguments in an attempt to vindicate 
the state’s place in the uncertain geopolitical terrain of North 
America. Part III then steps back to examine how the state-
sponsored litigation that these lawmakers organized in the 1840s 
informed the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, before ex-
ploring how this neglected history can help broaden our collective 
imagination for thinking through open questions of federalism 
today. 
I.  ORIGINS: INVENTING STATE CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA’S  
AGE OF SLAVERY 
According to existing accounts, the antislavery lawyers who 
began using the State Citizenship Clause in the antebellum era 
did so in an attempt to secure the rights of national citizenship 
for free blacks, at a time when the vocabulary and concept of na-
tional citizenship remained inchoate, at best.30 But as those who 
lived through the brutal realities of America’s age of slavery knew 
all too well, the turn to state citizenship stemmed from a different 
set of reasons. 
As this Part argues, by the time these activists began to con-
struct what became the country’s most prominent challenge to the 
 
 29 See, for example, Katherine Franke, Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Win-
ning Gay Rights, 44 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 1, 4–5 (2012) (arguing for the need to “recognize 
and account for the manner in which [nongovernmental actors] . . . often find their work 
and their interests taken up and deployed by state actors”). 
 30 For accounts emphasizing the absence of national-citizenship claims in antebel-
lum America, see note 9. For accounts emphasizing the interchangeability of the catego-
ries, and in particular the tendency for antislavery activists to use the State Citizenship 
Clause to argue for national citizenship, see Bruce E. Boyden, Constitutional Safety Valve: 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a Federalist System, 62 Ala L 
Rev 111, 155 (2010) (arguing that the antebellum debates over the rights of citizens in 
northern states “did not distinguish sharply between state citizens and national citizens”); 
Hamburger, 105 Nw U L Rev at 92 (cited in note 4) (observing that “advocates for free 
blacks” used Article IV’s State Citizenship Clause to “insist[ ] that free blacks were citi-
zens of the United States”); Burrell, 35 Whittier L Rev at 277 (cited in note 4) (same); 
Antieau, 9 Wm & Mary L Rev at 25 (cited in note 4) (“[T]he Privileges and Immunities 
Clause . . . was the prime recognition of national citizenship.”). 
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laws of racial discrimination using the State Citizenship Clause 
of Article IV, they had at their disposal a slew of inherited argu-
ments based on national citizenship—arguments that had proven 
unable to build a viable movement for social change. Confronted 
with the limits of these older claims in a North defined by deep 
racism and extensive investments in southern slavery, these ac-
tivists turned to state citizenship not with the primary goal of se-
curing national citizenship for free blacks, but rather in hopes of 
securing the intervention of one of the oldest and once most 
powerful governments in the Union: the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. By drawing on legal arguments internal to the 
practices of commercial law and dominant understandings of 
state sovereignty, these lawyers sought to rescue the beleaguered 
abolitionist movement by reframing the issue of American slavery 
from the rights of a black person to the sovereignty of a free state. 
A. An Inherited Discourse of National Citizenship and Its 
Limits 
In the early 1830s, a decade before they launched their cam-
paign against the police laws of the southern states, the newest 
generation of abolitionists in Boston set out with a plan to tell 
their fellow Americans about the wrongs of slavery. They had 
done so with a set of arguments premised not on state citizenship, 
but on national citizenship, tied to the founding documents and 
the promises of natural liberty.31 Although these words of na-
tional citizenship that the Boston activists inscribed into their 
earliest pamphlets and preached from their pulpits would later 
be celebrated as the product of Lincoln’s armies marching for free-
dom in the 1860s,32 they had in fact emerged half a century earlier 
in the old Atlantic world of the Enlightenment. 
One could trace this founding language of protest in the 
paper trail that the Boston activists had left behind: a paper trail 
that consisted of pamphlets and newspaper editorials, tran-
scribed speeches and printed sermons, private letters and rec-
orded conversations—many later stored away in the New England 
Anti-Slavery Society’s office on Washington Street.33 There was, 
to begin with, the pamphlet that several in the society credited 
 
 31 See notes 46–61 and accompanying text. 
 32 See note 9. 
 33 For the location of the society’s office on Washington Street and the storage of 
antislavery publications, see Walter M. Merrill and Louis Ruchames, ed, 5 The Letters of 
William Lloyd Garrison: Let the Oppressed Go Free, 1861–1867 31 n 7 (Belknap 1979). 
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with inspiring them to take action in the first place: the infamous 
call to arms by a man named David Walker, who knew firsthand 
of the horrors of slavery.34 Penned in 1828, Walker’s pamphlet 
drew on a vernacular of protest that had sounded in the black 
churches and Quaker meeting halls of the Atlantic coast since the 
late 1700s, premised on a careful braiding together of the natural 
rights said to belong to all men and the lofty promises inscribed 
in the founding documents of the nation.35 
An “Appeal . . . to the Coloured Citizens of the World,” the 
title page of Walker’s pamphlet proclaimed, “but in particular, 
and very expressly, to those of the United States of America.”36 The 
phrase was electric with possibilities, offering a claim of belong-
ing that rose above the ugly interrogations of slavery: “Well, boy, 
who do you belong to?”37 Citizens of the United States: a claim that 
gave the lie to the Founders’ promise of equality. “Why, I thought 
the Americans proclaimed to the world,” Walker wrote, “that they 
are a happy, enlightened, humane and Christian people, [and 
that] all the inhabitants of the country enjoy equal Rights!!”38 
Working from this label of national citizenship, Walker had 
urged his readers to rise up and vindicate their rights on the 
world stage. “Hear your language, proclaimed to the world [on] 
July 4th, 1776,” his pamphlet read.39 “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident—that ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL!!”40 
 
 34 See generally David Walker, Walker’s Appeal, in Four Articles; Together with a 
Preamble, to the Coloured Citizens of the World, but in Particular, and Very Expressly, to 
Those of the United States of America (1829). See also Peter P. Hinks, Introduction, in 
Peter P. Hinks, ed, David Walker’s Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World xi, xliii 
(Penn State 2000); Walker’s Appeal: To the Editor of the Liberator, Liberator (Jan 29, 1831) 
(endorsing Walker’s pamphlet as one that contained many valuable truths). 
 35 See, for example, Patrick Rael, Black Identity and Black Protest in the Antebellum 
North 97–106 (North Carolina 2002). See also generally, for example, Stephen Kantrowitz, 
More than Freedom: Fighting for Black Citizenship in a White Republic, 1829–1889 
(Penguin 2012) (tracing the rise of claims for national citizenship in the antebellum era); 
Andrew K. Diemer, The Politics of Black Citizenship: Free African Americans in the Mid-
Atlantic Borderland, 1817–1863 (Georgia 2016) (examining the tactics by which free blacks 
laid claim to the rights of national citizenship). 
 36 Walker, Walker’s Appeal (cited in note 34) (emphasis added). 
 37 Letter from Frederick Douglass to William Lloyd Garrison (May 23, 1846), in John 
R. McKivigan, ed, 1 The Frederick Douglass Papers—Series Three: Correspondence 127, 
132 (Yale 2009) (recalling how an American had approached him while in London and 
asked “in much the same tone which a white man employs when addressing a slave by the 
way-side—‘Well, boy, who do you belong to?’”) (emphasis omitted). 
 38 Walker, Walker’s Appeal at 82 n * (cited in note 34). 
 39 Id at 85. 
 40 Id. 
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Such was the power of these opening words of dissent, prem-
ised on the label of national citizenship, that they continued to 
sound in Boston long after Walker’s body was found dead near his 
home.41 In the newspapers, there were reports that after the pam-
phlet appeared, black men and women had begun to linger longer 
on Boston’s sidewalks, insisting on their rights.42 The pastor of 
the First African Baptist Church, for one, described his congre-
gation as being “composed of American citizens.”43 And when, 
two years later, the Reverend Samuel Snowden traveled to 
Philadelphia for the first Convention of the People of Color, he 
helped weave Walker’s words into the organization’s founding 
documents.44 The nation’s Constitution, the delegates proclaimed, 
“guarantees in letter and spirit to every freeman born in this 
country, all the rights and immunities of citizenship.”45 
Indeed, when, in December of 1830, a small group of young 
white journalists and lawyers gathered in one of the city’s law 
offices to organize the New England Anti-Slavery Society, they 
too enlisted the language of national citizenship.46 In the fall of 
that year, for example, when William Lloyd Garrison, a twenty-
five-year-old writer who soon became the organization’s main 
scribe, placed his first ad for a meeting hall in Boston where he 
could speak out against slavery,47 he explained that he wished to 
persuade the people of the city to help “vindicate the rights of 
TWO MILLIONS of American citizens.”48 A few months later, 
Garrison put these same sentiments into the first issue of the 
 
 41 For discussion of the circumstances of Walker’s death, see Rufus Burrow Jr, God 
and Human Responsibility: David Walker and Ethical Prophecy 22–23 (Mercer 2003). 
 42 See, for example, R.I. American (Sept 24, 1830). 
 43 Kantrowitz, More than Freedom at 35 (cited in note 35). 
 44 See James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, In Hope of Liberty: Culture, Com-
munity, and Protest among Northern Free Blacks, 1700–1860 213 (Oxford 1997). See also 
Peter P. Hinks, To Awaken My Afflicted Brethren: David Walker and the Problem of Ante-
bellum Slave Resistance 76 (Penn State 1997) (describing Snowden’s relationship with 
Walker); Minutes and Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of the People of Color, 
Liberator (Oct 22, 1831) (listing Snowden as a delegate). 
 45 Minutes and Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of the People of Color, 
Liberator (cited in note 44) (emphasis added). 
 46 For the founding of the New England Anti-Slavery Society, see Henry Wilson, 1 
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America 223–36 (Houghton Mifflin 1872). 
Those who gathered in the law offices for the founding meeting of the society included 
William Lloyd Garrison, a writer, as well as three lawyers: Ellis Gray Loring, Samuel E. 
Sewall, and David Lee Child. Id at 223. 
 47 Letter from William Lloyd Garrison to Oliver Johnson (Feb 5, 1874), in Walter M. 
Merrill and Louis Ruchames, eds, 6 The Letters of William Lloyd Garrison: To Rouse the 
Slumbering Land, 1868–1879 293, 294 (Belknap 1981). 
 48 Id (emphasis added). 
2018] Citizens of the State 879 
 
Liberator, soon to become one of the most well-known antislavery 
publications in the nation.49 Financed by subscriptions and dona-
tions from the city’s black abolitionists, who were themselves reg-
ular contributors to the paper, the first issues roared with the 
words of national citizenship.50 “I address you as men—I address 
you as freemen—I address you as countrymen,” the opening edi-
torial announced in January of 1831.51 All men born on the soil of 
America, this opening editorial continued, were “Americans by 
birth, and entitled to all the benefits of a republican government.”52 
Codified in these opening pages of the Liberator, this refrain 
of national citizenship began to course through the speeches that 
rang through antislavery meeting halls across the state. “He con-
tended that the American slaves are American citizens,” a re-
porter observed in the autumn of 1831, after listening to Garrison 
speak to the men and women of Lowell, where the white hands of 
factory workers turned the cotton from the plantations into 
thread.53 “That having been born here,” the reporter continued, 
“this is their home.”54 In the spring of 1833, meanwhile, when 
Garrison and his colleagues traveled down to Philadelphia to lay 
the foundations for the American Anti-Slavery Society, they fol-
lowed the lead of their black counterparts and inscribed the same 
phrase of national citizenship into the formal mission state-
ment.55 The goal of the organization, Garrison wrote, two years 
before he watched the sky pass overhead as a mob dragged him, 
legs bound, behind a wagon down State Street,56 was “to secure to 
the colored population of the United States all the rights and 
privileges which belong to them as men, and as Americans.”57 
 
 49 To the Free People of Color of the United States, Liberator (Jan 15, 1831). 
 50 See Ira Berlin, Slavery, Freedom, and Philadelphia’s Struggle for Brotherly Love, 
1685 to 1861, in Richard Newman and James Mueller, eds, Antislavery and Abolition in 
Philadelphia: Emancipation and the Long Struggle for Racial Justice in the City of Broth-
erly Love 19, 36 (LSU 2011) (describing James Forten’s role in financing the Liberator). 
 51 To the Free People of Color in the United States, Liberator (cited in note 49). 
 52 Id (emphasis added). 
 53 Lectures on Slavery, Lowell Mercury (Aug 27, 1831). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See The Constitution of the Anti-Slavery Society: With the Declaration of the Na-
tional Anti-Slavery Convention at Philadelphia, December, 1833, and the Address to the 
Public, Issued by the Executive Committee of the Society in September, 1835 9 (American 
Anti-Slavery Society 1838). 
 56 See James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, 1 Hard Road to Freedom: The Story 
of African America 129 (Rutgers 2001). 
 57 Declaration of the Anti-Slavery Convention, Assembled at Philadelphia, December 
4, 1833 (Library of Congress), archived at http://perma.cc/5SNM-36JD. 
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The same refrain provided the default vernacular for the boil-
erplate forms that the national organization’s newly hired secre-
tary began to prepare in the organization’s rented office in 
Manhattan. “The people of color ought at once to be emancipated 
and recognized as citizens,” the secretary wrote in the instructions 
sent to its agents in the field in February of 1834.58 “[T]heir 
rights [ought to be] secured as such, equal in all respects to oth-
ers, according to the cardinal principle laid down in the American 
Declaration of Independence.”59 Those who received commissions 
in the mail with these instructions to communicate the wrongs of 
slavery and the rights of man packed their bags and set out for 
the countryside. They avoided the cities, following the roads that 
gave way to mud and led to towns where those who knew the 
weight of a plough would listen and be moved to change the world 
in the name of America and its peoples.60 Those who did not re-
ceive a commission on account of their sex spoke out when they 
could and wrote with abandon.61 
In the frenzy of these nascent organizing efforts, no one 
paused to put down in writing where this category of national cit-
izenship had come from, much less whether it could carry the 
weight of a movement to bring down the laws of slavery. Had they 
done so, these activists may well have had reason to question the 
rhetorical power of national citizenship. As scholars of the early 
republic would later begin to uncover, such claims had originally 
appeared with regard to people of color not owing to any well-
spring of concern for their fundamental rights, but rather out of 
the administrative exigencies of transatlantic foreign relations 
and trade.62 
 
 58 American Anti-Slavery Society, Commission to Theodore Weld (Feb 20, 1834), in 
Gilbert H. Barnes and Dwight L. Dumond, eds, 1 Letters of Theodore Dwight Weld, 
Angelina Grimké Weld, and Sarah Grimké, 1822–1844 124, 126 (Peter Smith 1965) (en-
closing commission form instructions regarding Weld’s appointment as an agent of the 
American Anti-Slavery Society) (emphasis added). 
 59 Id (emphasis added). 
 60 See id at 127; Letter from Theodore Weld to Charles Finney (Feb 28, 1832), in 
Barnes and Dumond, eds, 1 Weld Letters 66, 67 (cited in note 58); Letter from Theodore 
Weld to Lewis Tappan (Apr 5, 1836), in Barnes and Dumond, eds, 1 Weld Letters 286, 287–
89 (cited in note 58). 
 61 See Letter from Lydia Maria Child to Louisa Loring (Apr 8, 1837), in Lydia Maria 
Child Papers (on file at Schlesinger Library, Harvard University) (describing how, although 
being denied a commission to lecture, she nevertheless found opportunities to speak out 
against slavery). 
 62 See generally, for example, Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors: Becoming 
American in the Age of Revolution (Belknap 2015) (tracing the emergence of claims of 
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Claims of belonging to a place called America, for example, 
dated back to the earliest days of the Revolutionary War, when 
men who found themselves stranded in prisons abroad spoke of 
themselves as belonging to the continent that lay at the other side 
of the Atlantic Ocean—no need to mention the states whose bor-
dered lands had yet to crystalize on the charts of navigation.63 In 
the halls of the newly independent Congress, meanwhile, where 
the first reference to an American citizen in the federal statute 
books appeared in reference to a ship owner, lawmakers enlisted 
the category of national citizenship to police the terms of entry to 
the ports along the southern Atlantic coast, where ships built in 
New England hauled out each day to carry the produce of the 
southern plantations to the markets of the world.64 Down along 
the wharves of the coast, meanwhile, newly appointed customs 
officers handed out forms certifying that the vessels and crew 
bound for foreign shores were indeed American—never mind the 
color of a man’s skin65—while captains carried invoices for goods 
that listed ownership by “citizens of the United States.”66 Indeed, 
years later, when abolitionists sought proof that free people of 
 
American citizenship in the late 1700s); Elizabeth Stordeur Pryor, Colored Travelers: Mo-
bility and the Fight for Citizenship before the Civil War 103–05, 132–33 (North Carolina 
2016) (arguing that British ship owners provided better treatment to white Americans 
than to black Americans traveling across the Atlantic because of “economic self-interest” 
and a fear that equal treatment might create “political and social controversy,” thereby 
increasing racial tensions on board). 
 63 See, for example, Letter from Thomas Barnes to John Adams (Aug 25, 1778), in 
Robert J. Taylor, ed, 6 Papers of John Adams 394, 395 (Belknap 1983) (“I am a Subject to 
the Continent of America.”); From Robert Harrison (Oct 7, 1778), in Claude A. Lopez, ed, 
27 The Papers of Benjamin Franklin 517, 517 (Yale 1988) (“I Was Borne in Newbery north 
ameraca [sic].”); The American Commissioners to Necker (Oct 9, 1778), in Lopez, ed, 27 
The Papers of Benjamin Franklin 526, 526 (cited in note 63) (“Captain Peter Collass of 
Boston in America.”). For the absence of state territorial borders on maps used in transat-
lantic trade, see, for example, John Malham, A Correct Chart of the East Coast of North 
America, Engraved for Malham’s Naval Gazetter (Allen & West 1795), archived at 
http://perma.cc/EL29-S88V. 
 64 See An Act for Laying a Duty on Goods, Wares, and Merchandises Imported into 
the United States § 1, 1 Stat 24, 24–26 (1789). 
 65 See Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors at 221–28 (cited in note 62) (explaining the 
process by which customhouse officers issued certificates of citizenship to seamen, and the 
absence of exclusionary language for African Americans). See also The Four Seamen, Conn 
Herald (Sept 1, 1807) (reporting that four people of color aboard a merchant ship had 
“American protections” and were deemed to be “Americans”). For a more recent account of 
the centrality of the custom houses in the formation of the early administrative state, see 
generally Gautham Rao, National Duties: Custom Houses and the Making of the American 
State (Chicago 2016). 
 66 See, for example, Invoice of Sixteen Bundles (July 8, 1796), in Moses Brown Papers 
(on file in Box 4, Baker Library, Harvard Business School); Invoice of Sundries (Mar 17, 
1797), in Moses Brown Papers (cited in note 66). 
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color were national citizens, they pointed to this long-standing 
practice by which federal administrative officials had recognized 
black ship owners and crewmen as Americans.67 
Perhaps not surprisingly in light of these administrative ori-
gins, the language of national citizenship designed to keep the 
ships of commerce in motion had proven ill suited to bring down 
the edifice of slavery. As the activists who set out on the road of 
persuasion quickly discovered, there were profound limits to a 
strategy based on telling white people about the rights of their 
enslaved brethren. In the letters that began to arrive from anti-
slavery agents in the field, one could hear the slow realization 
that theirs was a campaign whose aspirational words had failed 
to take root in a North where many questioned the difference be-
tween free soil and slave soil.68 
The best writer among the activists, a woman named Lydia 
Maria Child, soon discovered that any time the topic of slavery 
came up, her sister-in-law collapsed into the sofa and waited for 
someone to change the subject.69 When Child published a book 
referring to “Americans called Africans,” meanwhile, she re-
ceived a stack of angry letters containing canceled subscriptions 
to her magazine.70 When Child next moved to the western hills 
of Massachusetts, where her husband hoped to produce sugar 
that had no connection to slave labor, she learned that her neigh-
bor, a certain Mr. Napier, derived his fortune from the slave 
trade.71 On Sundays, Child watched as Mr. Napier walked down 
to the church, where he stood before the children and told them 
that God had ordained Africans to slavery.72 When Child went 
down to the church to see about holding an antislavery meeting, 
 
 67 See Speech by Mr. Storrs, excerpted in William Yates, Rights of Colored Men to 
Suffrage, Citizenship and Trial by Jury 46, 47 (Books for Libraries 1838). 
 68 See, for example, Frederick Douglass, Autobiographies, in Michael Meyer, ed, 
Frederick Douglass: The Narrative and Selected Writings 1, 111 (Modern Library 1984) 
(describing the sense of alienation upon arriving in an ostensibly free state); Harriet Ann 
Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl. 241 (Negro History 1861) (describing her dis-
illusionment with the concept of a free state); Henry Bibb, Narrative of the Life and Ad-
ventures of Henry Bibb, an American Slave, Written by Himself. 62 (1849) (critiquing 
Ohio’s failure as a nominally free state to offer protection for African Americans). 
 69 Letter from Lydia Maria Child to Caroline Weston (Aug 13, 1838), in Child Papers 
(cited in note 61). See also Letter from Lydia Maria Child to Ellis Gray and Louisa Loring 
(July 10, 1838), in Child Papers (cited in note 61). 
 70 Lori Kenschaft, Lydia Maria Child: The Quest for Racial Justice 6 (Oxford 2002). 
 71 Letter from Lydia Maria Child to Caroline Weston (July 27, 1838), in Child Papers 
(cited in note 61). 
 72 Id. 
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the minister shook his head.73 No, they didn’t want that sort of 
thing here. Of course the minister thought “slavery [was] wrong 
in the abstract,” 74 but it would not sit well with Mr. Napier,75 who, 
Child later learned, paid a third of the reverend’s salary.76 
The lecturers who followed the roads farther afield encoun-
tered challenges of their own. In the towns nestled within the trib-
utaries of the Ohio River Valley, where newly built steamboats 
destined for the cotton and sugar fields had begun to pass by with 
an ever-quickening wake,77 the lecturers described hopeful mass 
conversions but encountered angry crowds, and often rode out of 
town the next morning wearing damp jackets that smelled of rot-
ten eggs and lamp oil.78 In Cincinnati, lecturers reported that 
“[e]very church door is closed to abolitionists”79 in a land pre-
served in memory today as part of the North, but that the lectur-
ers knew all too well was “intimately and extensively involved 
with the [S]outh.”80 
Along the freshly settled coast of northern Maine, mean-
while, those who refused to be silenced discovered the blunt force 
of apathy. In the quiet fishing villages, people came with stones 
in their pockets to the meeting house where a black man was 
scheduled to speak. “[I]f I must be stoned, be it so,” Charles Lenox 
Remond said, as he stood amidst the shattered window glass, his 
voice breaking through their jeers and escalating laughs:81 
 
 73 Letter from Lydia Maria Child to Theodore Weld (Dec 18, 1838), in Gilbert H. 
Barnes and Dwight L. Dumond, eds, 2 Letters of Theodore Dwight Weld, Angelina Grimké 
Weld, and Sarah Grimké, 1822–1844 726, 729 (Peter Smith 1965). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Letter from Lydia Maria Child to Caroline Weston (July 27, 1838), in Child Papers 
(cited in note 71). 
 76 Letter from Lydia Maria Child to Theodore Weld at 729 (cited in note 73). 
 77 See Louis C. Hunter and Beatrice Jones Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Riv-
ers: An Economic and Technological History 37–43 (Harvard 1949) (describing trade routes 
along the Ohio Valley down to New Orleans). See also Matthew Salafia, Slavery’s Border-
land: Freedom and Bondage along the Ohio River 118–25 (Pennsylvania 2013) (tracing the 
connections between slave and free states in the Ohio River Valley). 
 78 See, for example, Letter from Theodore Weld to Elizur Wright Jr (Mar 2, 1835), in 
Barnes and Dumond, eds, 1 Weld Letters 205, 207 (cited in note 58); Letter from J.W. 
Alvord to Theodore Weld (Feb 9, 1836), in Barnes and Dumond, eds, 1 Weld Letters 259, 
260 (cited in note 58). 
 79 Ohio Anti-Slavery Society, Report of the Second Anniversary of the Ohio Anti-
Slavery Society 26 (1837). 
 80 Id at 49. 
 81 Letter from Charles Lenox Remond to Austin Willey (Oct 27, 1839), in C. Peter 
Ripley, ed, 3 The Black Abolitionist Papers: The United States, 1830–1846 314, 315 (North 
Carolina 1991). 
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[I]f they must walk over my prostrate and bleeding body, be 
it so; for while I lived, and a single slave clanks his chain 
upon the soil which gave me birth, I will exercise the prerog-
ative of thinking and speaking in his behalf, though slave-
holders, mobocrats, eggs and brickbats multiply as fast and 
as thick as the locusts of Egypt.82 
Even in the cosmopolitan cities along the Massachusetts Bay, 
where men who proudly called themselves Federalists had long 
spoken out against the wrongs of slavery, decades of arguments 
based on the natural rights of a black man had failed to translate 
into any meaningful action.83 In Boston, a city preserved in 
memory as the center of the abolitionist movement,84 but where 
those whose mills helped finance the plantations lived in well-lit 
brick houses on Beacon Hill,85 and where doorkeepers and dea-
cons and boys in white aprons repeated the daily refrain, “[w]e 
don’t allow n—–rs in here,”86 the language of the rights of a black 
man fell on deaf ears. “Boston is yet a stronghold of slavery,” 
Garrison confided to a friend in early 1836,87 as “many gentlemen 
of property and influence” began to call upon the legislature to 
limit the city’s abolitionist society.88 
In the New York offices of the American Anti-Slavery Society, 
meanwhile, things looked little better. The secretary tallied up 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 For information on the prominence of an antislavery tradition among New 
England Federalists, see, for example, Marc M. Arkin, The Federalist Trope: Power and 
Passion in Abolitionist Rhetoric, 88 J Am Hist 75, 76 (2001); Matthew Mason, “Nothing Is 
Better Calculated to Excite Divisions”: Federalist Agitation against Slave Representation 
during the War of 1812, 75 New Eng Q 531, 533 (2002). 
 84 See, for example, J. Morgan Kousser, “The Supremacy of Equal Rights”: The Strug-
gle against Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 Nw U L Rev 941, 1009 (1988) (referring to Boston as the 
“fountainhead of the abolitionist movement”). 
 85 See Frederic Cople Jaher, The Urban Establishment: Upper Strata in Boston, 
New York, Charleston, Chicago, and Los Angeles 51–52 (Illinois 1982); Richard H. 
Abbott, Cotton & Capital: Boston Businessmen and Antislavery Reform, 1854–1868 8–
22 (Massachusetts 1991). 
 86 Letter from Frederick Douglass to William Lloyd Garrison (Jan 1, 1846), in Philip 
S. Foner, ed, 1 The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass: Early Years, 1817–1849 125, 
128 (International 1950) (emphasis omitted). 
 87 Letter from William Lloyd Garrison to Samuel J. May (Jan 17, 1836), in Wendell 
Phillips Garrison and Francis Jackson Garrison, eds, 2 William Lloyd Garrison, 1805–
1879: The Story of His Life, Told by His Children 85 (Century 1885). 
 88 William Lloyd Garrison, The Boston Mob, II, in Garrison and Garrison, eds, 2 
Garrison Letters 1, 11 (cited in note 87). See also Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, 
Emancipator (cited in note 1); Letter from William Lloyd Garrison to Samuel J. May (Jan 
17, 1836) at 85 (cited in note 87). 
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the dwindling funds in the account books and saw what could per-
haps signal the beginnings of the end. “You must send us something 
to publish,” the secretary wrote in May of 1835 to one of the best 
agents in the field, who was then still traveling through the back-
woods of Ohio.89 “Remember we are asking of the abolition public 
money. They say to us, what are you doing with money?”90 In 
January of 1837, the organization decided to cut back on its pub-
lishing campaign altogether.91 By May of that year, the organiza-
tion had informed its members that “it will be impossible for the 
Committee to sustain their agencies, unless each agent collects 
an amount sufficient to pay his salary and expenses.”92 By the fol-
lowing winter, the number of agents had fallen from sixty to 
nineteen.93 
To those who began to take stock of where things had gone so 
terribly wrong, the problem seemed to lie, at least in part, in the 
arguments on which they had built their campaign. “There was 
not principle enough among us to feel for the poor black man, de-
prived of all his rights,” Garrison declared at the annual meeting 
in Boston in January of 1839.94 “Men take narrow and superficial 
views, centering in self, instead of standing firmly on those eter-
nal principles, which embrace the rights and happiness of every 
human being,” Child had declared a few weeks earlier.95 The vast 
majority of the abolitionists were “mere passengers on a pleasure 
sail,” concluded their colleague, Theodore Weld.96 Confronted 
with the limits of claims of national citizenship, those at the helm 
of the movement began to experiment with a new set of legal ar-
guments—arguments constructed using ideas drawn not from the 
lofty promises of the nation, but from the elite world of commerce 
and power that promised to capture the attention of even the most 
ambivalent of audiences. 
 
 89 Letter from Elizur Wright Jr to Theodore Weld (May 26, 1835), in Barnes and 
Dumond, eds, 1 Weld Letters 221 (cited in note 58). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Leonard L. Richards, “Gentlemen of Property and Standing”: Anti-abolition Mobs 
in Jacksonian America 157 (Oxford 1970). 
 92 Id at 158. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, Emancipator (cited in note 1). 
 95 Letter from Lydia Maria Child to Theodore Weld (Dec 29, 1838), in Barnes and 
Dumond, eds, 2 Weld Letters 734, 735 (cited in note 73). 
 96 Letter from Theodore Weld to Gerrit Smith (Sept 16, 1839), in Barnes and 
Dumond, eds, 2 Weld Letters 795, 796 (cited in note 73). 
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B. The Turn to State Citizenship as a Strategic Tool 
To understand how and why Boston’s beleaguered lawyers 
and activists began to devise a new legal strategy based on state 
citizenship, we must first set aside the familiar map on which 
scholars have chronicled America’s constitutional history and in-
stead examine the particular material conditions and legal cul-
ture of the era. For theirs was an America defined not simply by 
a nationalist North facing off against a states’-rights South. 
Rather, theirs was an America defined by a centuries-old com-
mercial corridor that ran along the Atlantic coast, encircling a 
continent of ever-shifting territorial borders and unstable politi-
cal hierarchies. Set in that uncertain land, the category of state 
citizenship and corresponding claims of the rights and duties of 
states had become the primary means of regulating the many gov-
ernments who shared the continent, while preserving the move-
ment of property across jurisdictional borders. 
The first and most prominent feature of this forgotten map of 
North America lay in the central artery of slavery itself: the now-
forgotten commercial corridor that began in Boston Harbor and 
ran down to the mouth of the Mississippi in New Orleans, con-
necting the barren lands of New England to the rich soils of the 
Mississippi Delta. Although it has long since disappeared from 
the conventional map of American constitutional history, by the 
early 1830s this watery highway connecting North and South had 
become one of the most heavily trafficked trade routes in the 
Western hemisphere.97 By 1839, some $140 million worth of goods 
traveled along its shores.98 Within a single year, 400,000 barrels 
of flour, 2,000,000 bushels of grain, and 160,000 bales of cotton 
 
 97 See, for example, Samuel Eliot Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 
1783–1860 297 (Houghton Mifflin 1921) (finding that by 1831, the coastal corridor carried 
more tonnage than all the transatlantic shipping routes combined); Allan Pred, Manufac-
turing in the American Mercantile City: 1800–1840, 56 Annals Assn Am Geographers 307, 
309 (1966) (finding that by 1835, even “a fraction” of the amount of domestic coastal ton-
nage surpassed the tonnage of foreign trade vessels arriving in New York, Boston, and 
Philadelphia). See also Lawrence A. Herbst, Interregional Commodity Trade from the 
North to the South and American Economic Development in the Antebellum Period, 35 J 
Econ Hist 264, 265 (1975); Albert Fishlow, Antebellum Interregional Trade Reconsidered, 
54 Am Econ Rev 352, 362 (1964) (observing that although the corridor constituted the 
most “important artery of interregional commerce,” it was “one about which we know per-
haps least”); Merl E. Reed, Footnote to the Coastwise Trade—Some Teche Planters and 
Their Atlantic Factors, 8 La Hist 191, 191 (1967); Diane Lindstrom, Southern Dependence 
upon Interregional Grain Supplies: A Review of the Trade Flows, 1840–1860, 44 Ag Hist 
101, 104–05 (1970). 
 98 See Fishlow, 54 Am Econ Rev at 360 (cited in note 97). 
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arrived in Boston from southern states.99 By the time the aboli-
tionists gathered in 1839 to take stock of their dwindling move-
ment for emancipation, nearly half of every pig butchered in the 
slaughterhouses of New Orleans for export ended up on a ship 
bound for Boston,100 while Boston’s merchants in turn sent down 
shoes for every black person who could be sold on an auction block 
along the wharves of the Mississippi.101 
Although long forgotten today, the activists at the helm of the 
movement were well aware of the corridor’s role in perpetuating 
slavery. As Garrison was quick to point out, it was this bustling 
corridor of commerce, not the racist ways of backward southern-
ers on the plantations, that fueled slavery’s horrific growth. “Why 
are the slaves held in bondage?” he had asked his readers in 
1831.102 The answer, he explained, lay in the demands of the 
emerging cities along the Atlantic seaboard. “They say to her,” 
Garrison wrote of the free states addressing the plantation coast, 
“Raise all the cotton that you can, and we will manufacture the 
raw material. We will consume your rice, your tobacco, your sugar 
and molasses, and give you higher prices than you can obtain else-
where.”103 As he explained in the prospectus to the Liberator, 
“There is innocent blood upon our garments, there is stolen prop-
erty in our houses; and everyone of us has an account to settle 
with the present generation of blacks.”104 
Born of the exigencies of trade, the key to the preservation of 
this corridor lay in accommodating a second feature of the North 
American terrain: the highly unstable interior of ever-shifting 
territorial boundaries and inchoate entities called states. Theirs 
was an America in which, within a matter of decades, ancient col-
onies had become states, provinces had become republics, repub-
lics had devolved back into states, states had lopped off vast dis-
tricts, and districts had in turn emerged once more as states—a 
land where maps of the nation were rendered out of date on a 
near-annual basis and where it was anyone’s best guess as to 
 
 99 J. Hancock, The Merchant’s and Trader’s Guide and Stranger’s Memorandum 
Book, for the Year of Our Lord 1836 28 (John Ford 1836). 
 100 Morison, The Maritime History at 298 (cited in note 97). 
 101 See Seth Rockman, Slavery and Abolition along the Blackstone, in Landscape of 
Industry: An Industrial History of the Blackstone Valley 110, 115 (UPNE 2009); Hancock, 
The Merchant’s and Trader’s Guide at 28 (cited in note 99). 
 102 Editorial Remarks, Liberator (Apr 23, 1831). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Prospectus of the Liberator, Liberator (June 18, 1831). 
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what final permutation of powers and geographic borders would 
ultimately emerge.105 
In that land of integrated commerce and capricious borders, 
the rules governing the states and their citizens had become the 
currency of persuasion among the continent’s feuding centers of 
political power. There was, to begin with, the basic rule that one 
of the Founders had declared to be the very edifice of union: the 
State Citizenship Clause of Article IV.106 Originally appearing in 
draft form in the Articles of Confederation, this clause provided 
that the citizens of one state were entitled to the privileges and 
immunities in the several states.107 Designed to facilitate mutual 
friendship and trade along the Atlantic coastal corridor,108 the pro-
vision had quickly become a favorite argument among commercial 
 
 105 See generally, for example, Declaration of Independence (declaring the colonies to 
be states); Unanimous Declaration of Independence by the Delegates of the People of 
Texas (1836) (declaring the former Mexican province of Texas to be an independent repub-
lic); Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States, Annexation of Texas (Mar 1, 
1845), in Hunter Miller, ed, 4 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States 
of America 689, 689 (US Government Publishing Office 1934) (declaring that the “territory 
properly included within, and rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas, may be 
erected into a new state”); An Act Relating to the Separation of the District of Maine 
from Massachusetts Proper, and Forming the Same into a Separate and Independent State 
(June 19, 1819) (consenting to the separation of the district of Maine from Massachusetts); 
Approval of the Constitution, and Admission of Missouri into the Union, HR 493, 16th 
Cong, 2d Sess (1820), reprinted in 2 Am State Papers 625 (Gales and Seaton 1834). For a 
useful visual representation of the rapid shifts in the internal boundary changes, see gen-
erally EarthDirect, Territorial History of the USA: Every Month for 400 Years, in Newberry 
Library, Atlas of Historical County Boundaries (Mar 13, 2013), online at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UE9uu9fKSg (visited Nov 13, 2017) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 106 Federalist 80 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 534, 537 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed). 
 107 See US Const Art IV, § 2, cl 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 108 See Articles of Confederation, Art IV, § 1, reprinted in 1 Stat 4, 4 (1789): 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among 
the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of 
these States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens 
in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and 
regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of 
trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, 
as the inhabitants thereof respectively. 
On the goals of the clause, see Burrell, 35 Whittier L Rev at 220 (cited in note 4) (“The aim 
of all three [proposed articles, which would ultimately become Article IV,] considered to-
gether was commercial harmony and antidiscrimination.”). 
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lawyers, who had used it on behalf of their clients in the ever-
growing work of collecting debts across state lines.109 
Burrowed away in private law offices for the opening decades 
of the early republic, the clause’s logic of a commercial union de-
fined by property in transit over a patchwork of jurisdictional bor-
ders had supplied the default premise for many of the most prom-
inent constitutional-law cases of the era. In a series of landmark 
cases decided shortly after the final defeat of the British in 1815, 
for example, the country’s most prominent lawyers had success-
fully challenged the constitutionality of various state laws not on 
the grounds of an emerging nationalism, but rather on the 
grounds that they interfered with the property rights of citizens 
of other states. In the case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v 
Woodward,110 for example, Daniel Webster had warned that a 
state that endeavored to regulate a corporation whose board seats 
and land holdings belonged to citizens of another state could jeop-
ardize interstate trade.111 Later that same year, in the case of 
 
 109 See, for example, Campbell v Morris, 3 H & McH 535, 537 (Md 1797) (lawyers 
using the State Citizenship Clause to argue that an out-of-state citizen in debt proceedings 
had the same protections as an in-state citizen); Ward v Morris & Nicholson, 4 H & McH 
330, 333 (Md 1799) (same); Kincaid v Francis, 3 Tenn (Cooke) 49, 50 (1812) (same); 
Sharpless v Knowles, 2 Cranch (CC) 129, 131 (DC 1816) (lawyers using the State Citizenship 
Clause to argue that an out-of-state citizen could take custody of a person acting as bail in 
the District of Columbia); Lavery v Woodland, 2 Del Cases 299, 307 (1817) (state court 
using the State Citizenship Clause to argue that an out-of-state citizen from Maryland 
had the same privileges as an in-state citizen to recover in an action of trover for the con-
version of his slave); Pearl v Rawdin, 5 Day 244, 247 (Conn 1812) (lawyers using the State 
Citizenship Clause to argue that an out-of-state citizen may recover an escaped prisoner); 
Custis v Lane, 3 Munf 579, 581–82 (Va 1813) (lawyers using the State Citizenship Clause 
to argue that a person born in territory that belonged to Virginia and subsequently became 
part of the District of Columbia could vote in Virginia elections); Chirac v Chirac’s Lessee, 
15 US (2 Wheat) 259, 264 (1817) (lawyers using the State Citizenship Clause to argue that 
Maryland could not grant particular privileges to noncitizens to hold lands in Maryland); 
Barrell v Benjamin, 15 Mass 354, 358 (1819) (state court using the State Citizenship 
Clause to argue that an out-of-state citizen from Connecticut had the same privileges as 
an in-state citizen to sue a foreigner). See also Bingham v Cabot, 3 US (Dall) 382, 383–84 
(1798) (finding that for purposes of establishing federal diversity jurisdiction, parties 
needed to set forth the citizenship of the respective parties); Admission of Missouri—
Senate, 16th Cong, 2d Sess, in 37 Annals of Cong 82 (Dec 9, 1820) (“Senate Consideration 
of Admission of Missouri on December 9, 1820”) (statement of Sen Holmes) (describing the 
State Citizenship Clause as one that allowed citizens of a state to acquire lands and en-
force contracts in other states). 
 110 17 US (4 Wheat) 518 (1819). 
 111 See id at 566–72. See also generally Daniel Webster, Argument, in Timothy 
Farrar, Report of the Case of the Trustees of Dartmouth College against William H. 
Woodward 238 (John W. Foster and West, Richardson & Lord 1819). For contemporary 
media coverage of the case that emphasized the multistate nature of the corporation, see, 
for example, New-Hampshire Legislature, Boston Daily Advertiser (June 20, 1816) (“The 
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McCulloch, Webster and his co-counsel had used the same argu-
ment to challenge a Maryland state law that attempted to tax the 
property of non–state citizens held in the Annapolis branch of the 
national bank.112 Perhaps emboldened by the success of this argu-
ment, in 1824, when Webster returned to the Supreme Court to 
challenge a New York state law in the case of Gibbons, he again 
did so not by invoking the primacy of the national government, 
but by enlisting the logic of an America defined by constant mo-
tion of property along an Atlantic coast of coequal states—an ar-
gument that helped secure the continuing life of the commercial 
corridor fueling slavery’s ascent.113 
 
scheme to be adopted relative to Dartmouth College is said to be, to enact that no person 
shall be a trustee of the corporation who is not an inhabitant of the State.”). See also An 
Act to Amend, Enlarge, and Improve the Corporation of Dartmouth College (June 18, 
1816), reprinted in Farmer’s Cabinet (June 22, 1816); New Hampshire Legislature, Boston 
Daily Advertiser (June 25, 1816); The College Question, Exeter Watchman (Sept 23, 1817), 
reprinted in Portsmouth Oracle (Sept 27, 1817) (framing the controversy as one “of which 
it is well known that the old Trustees lost their seats”). Working from the traditional view 
of federalism and a sectional map of North America, conventional accounts of the case 
have framed it not as a question involving the scope of a legislature’s powers over the 
property rights of noncitizens, but rather as the scope of a legislature’s powers over a cor-
poration. See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations 74 (Belknap 
1991) (describing Dartmouth College as a case that “insisted that the original Constitution 
granted fundamental rights to citizens against violation by the states no less than the 
national government”). See also Paul S. Boyer, et al, 1 The Enduring Vision: A History of 
the American People 170 (Houghton Mifflin 5th ed 2006) (offering a textbook account of 
the case as one that “focused on New Hampshire’s attempt to transform a private corpo-
ration, Dartmouth College, into a state university”). 
 112 McCulloch, 17 US (4 Wheat) at 328 (describing the national bank not as a 
federal institution, but as a multistate institution—not unlike the corporation at issue 
in Dartmouth College: “The United States have, and must have, property locally existing 
in all the States”). See also id at 396 (“The whole capital of the bank belonging to private 
stockholders, is drawn from every State in the Union.”). After describing the bank as a 
multistate institution, Webster and his co-counsel then deployed the same arguments used 
in Dartmouth College to warn that allowing one state to interfere in the property rights of 
a non–state citizen would lead to disruption of trade and interstate relations. See id at 328 
(“[W]hat hinders [Maryland] from imposing a stamp tax . . . on . . . all other documents 
connected with imposts and navigation? . . . [S]he can equally well shut up the custom 
house.”). 
 113 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 4–5 (describing the issue not as one between Congress 
and the states, but as between the laws of the various states that bordered the Atlantic 
coastline, and warning of the costs to trade if one state were allowed to encroach on the 
laws of another: “[I]f [the laws of New York] should be declared to be valid and operative, 
[Webster] hoped somebody would point out where the State right stopped, and on what 
grounds the acts of other States were to be held inoperative and void”). See also id at 24 
(“Virginia may well exercise, over the entrance of the Chesapeake, all the power that New-
York can exercise over the bay of New-York, and the waters on the shore. . . . The 
Chesapeake, therefore, upon the principle of these laws, may be the subject of State mo-
nopoly; and so may the bay of Massachusetts.”). 
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Outside of the nation’s law offices and courtrooms, mean-
while, the logic of the State Citizenship Clause had quickly be-
come a primary means of gauging the relative power of the never-
ending stream of new states erupting deep in the interior. In one 
of the most closely followed political debates of the century, for ex-
ample, members of Congress had seized on the State Citizenship 
Clause in 1820 to challenge the attempt by a new government 
erected at the heart of the Mississippi River Valley, in a distant 
foreign land called Missouri, to close its borders to all black people 
not held in slavery.114 In an era that we often associate with the 
beginning of American sectionalism, the State Citizenship Clause 
had provided politicians a means of shifting the issue from the 
rights of black people to the rights of the state governments vying 
for power.115 Allow the nascent state of Missouri to violate the 
State Citizenship Clause, one politician warned, and other states 
would follow suit, disrupting the “commercial relations between 
the several States.”116 
As these widely publicized debates made clear, the State 
Citizenship Clause could be used not simply to ensure the move-
ment of property and capital across state lines—it could also be 
used to sever the economic bonds that had allowed slavery to pros-
per. Well aware of this potential power to disrupt the commercial 
 
 114 For a different reading of the legislative debates surrounding the Second Missouri 
Crisis, see Hamburger, 105 Nw U L Rev at 83–96 (cited in note 4). 
 115 Admission of Missouri—Senate, 16th Cong, 2d Sess, in 37 Annals of Cong 48 (Dec 
7, 1820) (“[H]ow was it possible,” a senator from Rhode Island proclaimed, “that the power 
[to ban citizens of one state from entry] could be exercised by one of these States towards 
other States of the Union?”) (emphasis added); Admission of Missouri—Senate, 16th Cong, 
2d Sess, in 37 Annals of Cong 110 (Dec 11, 1820) (“Senate Consideration of Admission of 
Missouri on December 11, 1820”). See also id at 112 (“Our inquiry is, and it is the point 
which settles the question, are they citizens of any particular State?”) (emphasis added). 
Note that other participants framed the question as one of national citizenship. See Ad-
mission of Missouri—House of Representatives, 16th Cong, 2d Sess, in 37 Annals of Cong 
596 (Dec 11, 1820) (“The main question . . . involves but this single inquiry—Are free neg-
roes . . . citizens of the United States?”); Senate Consideration of Admission of Missouri on 
December 11, 1820, 16 Cong, 2d Sess at 110 (cited in note 115) (“The question,” Senator 
David Morril insisted, “is not what privileges may be violated, nor how many, nor to what 
degree, nor whether the citizen be black or white; but can we tamely suffer one State to 
deprive any citizen of any of his Constitutional rights and privileges?”) (emphasis added); 
Slavery, Patriot (Sept 19, 1820): 
[I]f Missouri has a right to prohibit one class of citizens, blacks or mulattos, from 
coming to, or residing in, that state, has not New-York the same right to prevent 
any other class of citizens in Missouri or in Virginia, owners of slaves, for in-
stance, from coming to or residing within our limits? 
 116 Admission of Missouri—House of Representatives, 16th Cong, 2d Sess, in 37 
Annals of Cong 574 (Dec 9, 1820) (emphasis added). 
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corridor upon which the economy of New England depended, the 
antislavery lawyers of Boston began to pair it with a second, 
equally well-recognized rule of the era: an unwritten, customary 
rule said to constitute the thin line separating a novel entity 
called a state from the vast wilderness of North America. Elegant 
in its simplicity, this rule held that a sovereign was duty bound 
to protect those who owed it allegiance.117 Ancient in its origins, 
the rule had sounded in the pine-shaded hillsides of Rome before 
migrating to the feudal manors of Britain and the kingdoms of 
renaissance Europe, where it echoed in the treatises of the early 
modern world.118 According to the rule’s logic, a sovereign that 
failed to protect its citizens from violence effectively abdicated its 
right to rule. As the German treatise writer Samuel von Pufendorf 
had explained as early as 1688, “[I]njury done to one of its mem-
bers by foreigners is regarded as affecting the entire state.”119 As 
such, the Swiss philosopher Emmerich de Vattel clarified a cen-
tury later, “Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the 
State, which must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the in-
jured citizen must avenge the deed . . . , since otherwise the citizen 
will not obtain the chief end of civil society, which is protection.”120 
This idea of sovereignty had flourished in the new American 
Republic, at a time when the concept of a state remained ill de-
fined.121 Carried across the Atlantic in the writings of John Locke, 
 
 117 See, for example, Hamburger, 1992 S Ct Rev at 302 (cited in note 14) (“Following 
European writers, large numbers of Americans assumed that individuals established gov-
ernment to obtain protection for the liberty enjoyed in the state of nature.”). See also Let-
ter from Charles Sumner to Robert C. Winthrop (Feb 9, 1843), in Robert Winthrop Papers 
(Massachusetts Historical Society) (“[T]he duty of allegiance carries with it the correlative 
duty of protection on the part of the crown. This is feudal, at the same time that it finds 
its support in the principles of natural justice.”) (underlining in original). 
 118 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the 
Law of Nations, 78 U Chi L Rev 445, 472 (2011). See also Anne Peters, Beyond Human 
Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law 404 (Cambridge 2016) 
(Jonathan Huston, trans). 
 119 Samuel von Pufendorf, 2 De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo bk VIII, ch VI, 
§ 13 at 1305 (Clarendon 1934) (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather, trans) (originally 
published 1688). 
 120 Emmerich de Vattel, 3 The Law of Nations; or, The Principles of Natural Law Ap-
plied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns bk III, ch VI, § 71 at 
136 (Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (Charles G. Fenwick, trans) (originally 
published 1758). See also Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 472 (cited in note 118); 
Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Pol-
icy and the Law of Nations, 32 NYU J Intl L & Polit 1, 67 (1999) (noting ninety-two cita-
tions to Vattel in early American judicial decisions). 
 121 See Hepburn & Dundas v Ellzey, 6 US (2 Cranch) 445, 445 (1805) (“[T]he term 
‘states[ ]’ . . . is a vague expression.”). For an example of the ways in which politicians in 
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the idea that a government had a duty to protect its citizens had 
sounded in the churches of colonial New England on Sabbath 
mornings,122 reverberated through the constitutions of the newly 
created states,123 and punctuated the legislative debates in the 
newly formed Congress.124 Legitimized by history, this duty had 
become the basis by which those who enjoyed the privileges of 
power in the early republic sought to secure the intervention of 
the state government in their commercial dealings along the cor-
ridor. When, in the early 1800s, for example, Congress closed the 
international trading routes on which Boston’s merchant commu-
nity depended and later authorized federal officers to seize the 
property holdings of a Boston bank, the city’s elites successfully 
invoked the duty of protection to urge the state government to 
intervene on their behalf.125 
Brought to life in the contests for political power on an uncer-
tain continent, the State Citizenship Clause and these corre-
sponding claims of a state’s duty to protect its citizenry thus of-
fered the disillusioned activists of America a powerful set of tools 
for designing a new legal strategy. Beginning in the mid-1830s, 
 
early America described the shifting composition of the continent, see The Substance of 
Two Speeches on the Missouri Bill, Columbian Centinel (Jan 19, 1820) (quoting Senator 
Rufus King’s comment that “[t]he territory of Missouri is a portion of Louisiana, which 
was purchased of France, and belongs to the United States in full dominion”). 
 122 See Hamburger, 1992 S Ct Rev at 304 n 22 (cited in note 14) (offering clerical ex-
amples from eighteenth-century New England that discuss the purpose of government as 
protection). 
 123 See id at 315 n 46 (offering examples of early state constitutions that associated 
the government’s duty of protection with obedience and allegiance). For later examples, 
see Ohio Const Art VIII, § 1 (“[E]very free republican government, being founded on [the 
people’s] sole authority, and organized for the great purpose of protecting their rights and 
liberties . . . .”) (emphasis added); La Const Preamble (establishing a “form of government” 
in order to “secure to all the citizens thereof the enjoyment of the right of life, liberty and 
property”); Ind Const Preamble (establishing a “form of Government” in order to “establish 
Justice, promote the welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos-
terity”); Miss Const Preamble (establishing a “form of government” in order to “secure to 
the citizens thereof the rights of liberty and property”). 
 124 Senate Consideration of Admission of Missouri on December 9, 1820, 16 Cong, 2d 
Sess at 93 (cited in note 109) (speech of Sen Otis) (“To this relationship of a free citizen to 
his State, protection and allegiance were the necessary incidents.”). 
 125 See, for example, Report of the Massachusetts Legislature, NY Herald (Feb 18, 
1809) (“While this state maintains its sovereignty and independence, all the citizens can 
find protection . . . in the strong arm of the state government.”); Report of the Committee 
on the Memorial of the Directors of the New England Bank, Weekly Messenger (Feb 4, 
1814) (concluding that a state-chartered bank was “entitled . . . to the protection and sup-
port of the state”). For claims submitted to the legislature that cited this duty of protection, 
see Portland Resolutions, New-England Palladium (Jan 27, 1809). See also Dignified Po-
sition, of the Legislature of Massachusetts, NY Comm Advertiser (Feb 9, 1809). 
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they began to draw upon both rules as they set out to sever the 
central artery of commerce itself, targeting a series of state police 
laws that papered over the southern ports and that subjected any 
person of color found on board an arriving vessel to indefinite im-
prisonment.126 Although such laws had previously been chal-
lenged as a violation of the rights of national citizenship and a 
usurpation of the powers of the national government,127 the law-
yers who had witnessed the limits of such arguments set aside 
this old vernacular. Instead, they enlisted the category of state 
citizenship in an attempt to reframe the issue of slavery from the 
rights of a black man to the sovereign duties—and thus, the sov-
ereign existence—of Massachusetts. 
One could see the beginnings of this shift in the spring of 
1836, when the future of the antislavery movement looked partic-
ularly grim. Earlier that winter, resolutions had arrived in Boston 
from the state governments along the southern plantation coast, 
requesting that the legislature of Massachusetts do something to 
halt the flow of abolitionist pamphlets that continued to arrive in 
Charleston and New Orleans.128 Confronted with the possibility 
that their offices might be shut down, the directors of the New 
England Anti-Slavery Society seized this opportunity to plead 
their case in the public forum. In a series of publications that be-
gan to appear that spring and culminated with a formal report to 
the state legislature in 1839, they began to challenge the laws of 
the plantation South by pointing to the dangers it posed to the 
sovereignty of the Commonwealth. 
In a speech that Garrison delivered to the state legislature in 
March 1836, for example, he began by noting the limits of moral 
arguments. “I fear that moral considerations alone will not suffice, 
on the present occasion,” Garrison declared, as he stood before the 
state committee charged with responding to southern requests for 
 
 126 For a recent historical account of the police laws in question, including a summary 
of the state statutes in force, see Schoeppner, 31 L & Hist Rev at 560 n 1 (cited in note 3). 
 127 See, for example, Jared Bunce, et al, Free People of Color: Memorial of Sundry 
Masters of American Vessels Lying in the Port of Charleston, S.C., in 24 Niles’ Weekly Reg 
31, 31 (Mar 15, 1823) (protesting South Carolina’s Negro Seamen Act on the grounds that 
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censorship.129 Instead of reciting the old arguments premised on 
national citizenship, Garrison first drew his audience’s atten-
tion away from the distant plantations to the corridor along the 
Atlantic coast. Having reoriented the setting of slavery, Garrison 
then quoted the State Citizenship Clause in full, using it to re-
frame the issue from one of the wrongs done to the rights of black 
men to the rights of the state. “Where, then, are the rights of the 
citizens of this Commonwealth?” he asked. “Ay, sir, where are our 
STATE RIGHTS?”130 If the state hoped to preserve its rights, he 
concluded, it would need to fulfill its duty of protection. “The 
Legislature of this State,” he concluded, “ought to speak out in 
tones of thunder against a system, which is thus putting in ex-
treme peril the property, safety, and lives of the citizens of this 
Commonwealth.”131 
Perhaps emboldened by the success of this argument before 
the state committee, which voted later that spring not to crimi-
nalize the abolitionists’ activities, Garrison and his colleagues be-
gan to circulate it widely. In April of 1836, for example, a month 
after the hearings, Samuel Sewall, one of the lawyers who had 
helped found the organization, returned to the State House to 
urge the legislature to intervene in the southern police laws. No 
stranger to the rules of commerce, Sewall reached for the State 
Citizenship Clause that he had no doubt used in debt litigation 
for his clients. This time, however, he presented it alongside 
the duty of protection. “[T]he poor,” he began, “must look to the 
government under which they live for their protection.”132 A govern-
ment that failed in this duty of protection, he continued, was enti-
tled to no respect. “It is no honor to the state of Massachusetts,” he 
declared, “that she has . . . permitted so many of her citizens to 
suffer such grievances . . . under the laws of the southern States, 
without moving a finger to help them.”133 Immediately after in-
voking this duty, Sewall then cited the State Citizenship Clause 
as the constitutional basis for action, concluding that the petition-
ers had made a “very strong[ ] claim upon our Legislators, for 
their official interference for the protection of their constituents.”134 
 
 129 First Interview (Mar 4, 1836), in An Account of the Interviews Which Took Place on 
the Fourth and Eighth of March, between a Committee of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery 
Society and the Committee of the Legislature 11 (Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society 1836). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id at 12. 
 132 Honor to Whom Honor Is Due, Liberator (Apr 2, 1836) (emphasis added). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
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Not long after Sewall presented these arguments to the state 
legislature, Seth Whitmarsh, a member of the House and leader 
of the Democratic Party, braided the same arguments together—
perhaps with Sewall’s help—to create a scathing report that 
Garrison published in the Liberator.135 “It is a question,” the au-
thors of the Whitmarsh report began, referring to the police laws 
of the plantation coast, “which involves the rights, liberties and 
lives of our citizens, as also the sovereignty of the State.”136 Lest 
anyone miss what they meant by sovereignty, the authors of the 
report paused to explain: “It involves in it the question, whether 
the Commonwealth shall protect its citizens against violence.”137 
Failure to act, the authors warned, would destroy the state’s sov-
ereign status. “Let the legislature pause, and reflect deeply on a 
subject of so deep, so vital importance to the sovereignty of this 
Commonwealth,” the authors concluded, “if that sovereignty is to 
be preserved.”138 
Convinced of the power of this line of reasoning, the society’s 
lawyers soon began to develop the argument still further, placing 
the State Citizenship Clause within the broader logic and text of 
the Constitution to argue that failure to act would not only con-
stitute an abdication of the state’s sovereign duty but would also 
destroy the basic logic of interstate equality. As the authors of 
the report pointed out, the State Citizenship Clause appeared in 
Article IV: a provision of the Constitution listing the obligations 
that the states owed to one another and that jurists had analo-
gized to a treaty.139 By pairing the State Citizenship Clause of 
Article IV to the neighboring Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV—
a clause that effectively required all states to recognize the slave 
laws of other states—the abolitionists began to argue that under 
 
 135 Report on the Petition of George Odiorne and Others Relative to Certain Laws of 
Several of the Southern States, Liberator (Apr 23, 1836) (reprinting the report warning of 
the imminent demise of the Commonwealth). 
 136 Id (emphasis added). 
 137 Id (emphasis added). 
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 139 See, for example, Opinion of Chief Justice Hornblower, on the Fugitive Slave Law 
(Feb 1836), in 3 Fugitive Slaves and American Courts: The Pamphlet Literature 97, 101 
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the Constitution’s logic of equality, Massachusetts was entitled to 
demand that all states recognize its citizenship laws.140 
“Is it not right, and just, and equal,” the Whitmarsh report 
asked, “that while we rigidly adhere in this state to that portion 
of our national compact [the Fugitive Slave Clause], those 
states should as rigidly observe the other portion of that com-
pact [the State Citizenship Clause], which secures to the citi-
zens of Massachusetts, in every other state, the immunities and 
privileges enjoyed by their own citizens?”141 If the southern states 
refused to recognize the State Citizenship Clause, the authors ar-
gued, it would relieve Massachusetts of any reciprocal obligation 
to recognize the Fugitive Slave Clause—and thereby potentially 
sever the smooth functioning of the commercial corridor that was 
fueling slavery’s rise. 
By the summer of 1836, this potentially explosive argument 
had begun to appear not simply before the state legislature, but 
also in the state courts. Most notably, that August, members of 
the society filed a habeas corpus suit in state court in an attempt 
to secure the release of an enslaved child who had been brought 
to Massachusetts by a New Orleans woman whose father, a mer-
chant, lived in Boston.142 In the winning argument presented to 
the court, Ellis Loring, another of the society’s lead lawyers 
trained in commercial law, cited Louisiana’s refusal to recognize 
the citizenship laws of Massachusetts under Article IV as a jus-
tification for Massachusetts’s right to ignore the slave laws of 
Louisiana. “[T]here is no room here for reciprocity,” Loring ar-
gued, citing the Whitmarsh report. “[T]he comity which is due to 
freemen is not extended to us by the slaveholding states.”143 
In the antislavery literature, meanwhile, abolitionists contin-
ued to warn that failure on the part of the states to protect their 
citizens would effectively reduce the governments to barren plots 
of land, incapable of compelling enforcement of their laws at home 
 
 140 See US Const Art IV, § 2, cl 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). See also US Const Art IV, § 2, cl 3: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, es-
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the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due. 
 141 Report on the Petition of George Odiorne and Others, Liberator (cited in note 135). 
 142 See Med’s Case, in Case of the Slave-Child, Med: Report of the Arguments of Coun-
sel, and of the Opinion of the Court, in the Case of Commonwealth vs. Aves 3, 4 (Isaac 
Knapp 1836). 
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or abroad. “What is a state?” the abolitionist John Brown asked 
in 1838,144 in an editorial that Garrison declared to be “well wor-
thy of a careful perusal.”145 “It is the representative of the rights 
and powers of the citizens composing it,” he replied.146 And as the 
composite of its peoples, Brown continued, the state existed only 
for their protection. “The first duty of government is the protec-
tion of the rights of individuals,” he reasoned.”147 Abandon this 
duty of protection, Brown continued, and the state was nothing: 
“[A]n artificial, insensate, soulless being, an abstraction, a mere 
ideal entity, and of itself, entitled to no respect.”148 
Far from remaining confined to Massachusetts, this argu-
ment premised on the State Citizenship Clause quickly began to 
circulate in abolitionist circles. The following year, for example, 
activists in New York seized on the State Citizenship Clause to 
protest a law of New Jersey policing the entrance of free blacks.149 
Just as the abolitionists in Boston had used the Clause to pivot 
the conversation from the rights of people of color to the sover-
eignty of Massachusetts, so too did the New Yorkers now use cit-
izenship status to reflect back on the sovereignty of the state of 
New York. “You are citizens of the State,” the Colored American 
announced to its black readers, before using this label of state cit-
izenship to measure the relative power of New York and New 
Jersey. “[J]ust as much right has your State Legislature, to pass 
an act, requiring every red haired citizen to carry his free papers 
. . . as they have to require your compliance with a single requisi-
tion of that supplement.”150 Indeed, by 1838, a lawyer from upstate 
New York had placed the State Citizenship Clause as the center-
piece of his new grassroots organizing manual for abolitionists.151 
To be sure, this emphasis on state citizenship and corre-
sponding claims of the state’s sovereign duty to protect did not 
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extinguish the older arguments based on national citizenship.152 
And yet, when, in January of 1839, members of the New England 
Anti-Slavery Society assembled for their annual meeting and be-
gan to plan their activities for the year ahead, they agreed to tar-
get the police laws of the corridor not by invoking the category of 
national citizenship that once anchored the society’s publications; 
instead, that evening, Wendell Phillips, the most recent Harvard 
lawyer to join the organization, stood at the podium and invoked 
the label of state citizenship to describe a lone black man in the 
audience. Rather than using this label of state citizenship to ar-
gue for national citizenship, Phillips instead used it to reflect on 
the waning power of the Commonwealth. “[T]hat colored free cit-
izen I see yonder,” he declared, “if he set his foot in Savannah, is 
imprisoned until he can prove his own freedom.”153 Enlisting the 
image of the once mighty Roman Empire, Phillips then reminded 
his listeners of how far Massachusetts had fallen. “It was the 
boast of ancient Rome,” he proclaimed, “that she had thrown over 
her own citizens the shield of her own powerful protection . . . Not 
so with Massachusetts; her citizens are seized in sister states and 
sold into slavery.”154 
Not long after this meeting, these same arguments appeared 
in a twenty-eight-page report addressed to the state legislature. 
Signed by one of the society’s newest members, a young reverend 
from Nantucket who sent copies of his reports to Phillips, the re-
port bore little resemblance to the organization’s founding reli-
ance on national citizenship.155 In lieu of the earlier citations to 
the Declaration of Independence, it instead began with a citation 
to the State Citizenship Clause.156 Following the arguments that 
Garrison had first sketched out three years earlier, the report 
then warned that failure on the part of Massachusetts to inter-
vene in the police laws of the southern states would compromise 
not only the “interests and undoubted rights of [ ] merchants,” but 
 
 152 See, for example, Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, Emancipator (cited in note 
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also “the dignity and honor of this ancient Commonwealth.”157 The 
question, the report concluded, was whether Massachusetts 
would submit to this ignominious treatment by her peers. “[M]ust 
she quietly endure it all, merely because it chances to be done by 
her own sister states? . . . [W]ill she not, also, do what she may to 
protect and preserve the personal liberty of her citizens . . . ?” the 
report asked.158 
In February 1839, there was a glimmer of hope that this shift 
from the lofty promises of national citizenship to invocations of 
the state’s sovereign duty of protection had, at last, prevailed in 
breaking through years of inaction. Within a month after the rev-
erend from Nantucket had submitted his report, the legislature 
of Massachusetts issued the first formal protest against the laws 
of racial discrimination along the southern coast.159 Brief and to 
the point, this set of resolves asserted that the laws of the south-
ern states that authorized the arrest without trial and detain-
ment of free black men violated the State Citizenship Clause—a 
clause that abolitionists had borrowed from the practices of com-
mercial law with hopes of severing the nation’s central artery of 
slavery, perhaps not fully realizing that the Clause would soon be 
put to work for very different ends.160 
II.  ASCENDANCY: THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND THE SEARCH FOR 
A FEDERAL FORUM 
In the winter of 1844, five years after the legislature of 
Massachusetts issued its first official resolves against the police 
laws of the southern states, politicians in Boston appointed a 
state agent to take the unprecedented step of challenging the con-
stitutionality of these laws in federal court.161 In time, scholars 
who caught sight of this pivotal legal challenge would describe it 
as an attempt to secure the rights of national citizenship for free 
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blacks.162 But as this Part argues, archival records reveal that the 
lawmakers who organized this litigation did so with a different 
set of objectives. In particular, these records reveal that at a time 
of acute concern for the waning power of the Commonwealth, the 
organizers of the lawsuit turned to the federal courts not with the 
primary aim of securing national citizenship for free blacks, but 
rather to secure the state’s sovereign status without jeopardizing 
the economic bonds of union. Working with a model of interna-
tional dispute resolution borrowed from the Alien Tort Statute, 
these lawmakers made clear that in the integrated slave economy 
of America, a state would fulfill its sovereign duty of protection in 
the halls of federal court, not through the risky practices of ad hoc 
diplomacy or armed retaliation. 
A. The Concern for State Sovereignty and the Search for a 
Federal Forum 
When the lawmakers of Massachusetts assembled in the 
State House in 1839 and began to review the ever-growing num-
ber of abolitionist petitions warning of the threats that slavery 
posed to the sovereignty of the state, they had ample reason to 
pause and take notice. At a time when the region’s industrializing 
economy remained deeply dependent on the plantations of the 
southern coast, concerns had begun to sound for the waning 
status of the ancient Commonwealth. Once heralded as the 
“metropolis of the American plantations,” and the epicenter of 
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commerce,163 by the early 1840s the dramatic expansion of the 
plantation economy in the Mississippi River Valley and the rapid 
rise of the New York port had begun to present awkward ques-
tions about the fate of Boston and its hinterlands. For theirs was 
a city whose days of glory in the American Revolution had long 
since passed, a city whose decline meant that even its most es-
teemed families could no longer command the same level of power 
and influence they once enjoyed.164 
There was, to begin with, the basic question of territorial 
landmass. During the phase that historians would later refer to 
as “territorial expansion,” the land called Massachusetts that 
once appeared on maps with no clearly discernible western limits 
had contracted from 5 percent of the national landmass to less than 
half of 1 percent.165 “We shrink into pigmies, while Gigantic States 
stride over the Western and Southern Regions,” Massachusetts 
Senator Harrison Otis had observed back in 1819.166 “New England 
will ere long need sound heads and stout hearts,” the state’s lead-
ing spokesman, John Quincy Adams, had written home in April 
of 1841, “to save her from being made the football of the South.”167 
New England, he warned the following year, was “greatly reduced 
and daily declining in her influence as a component part of the 
union.”168 
The diminishing landmass was only the most visible sign of 
the Commonwealth’s waning influence. By the late 1830s, there 
were indications that the commercial privileges that Boston’s 
merchants had once enjoyed along the Atlantic shipping corridor 
that ran down to the plantations had begun to erode.169 Already, 
merchants in other ports along the commercial corridor had be-
gun to question their reliance on Boston. “Why should not the 
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State of Maine import her own goods?” an editorial had asked in 
1838. “Why should our merchants go to Boston and New York for 
their foreign goods?”170 That same winter, a politician in Mississippi 
reminded listeners that Mississippi was by no means obliged to 
rely on Massachusetts. “She can, if she pleases,” he declared of 
Mississippi, “build her own ships and man them with her own 
sailors.”171 Indeed, by 1842, the very existence of the shipping cor-
ridor seemed to be in jeopardy. That summer, a new tax policy 
conceived of by South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun was due to 
take effect that promised to open the ports of the plantation 
coast to imported goods from England,172 at a time when many 
questioned the exclusive privileges that Massachusetts’s ships 
and goods had traditionally enjoyed in the southern ports. “The 
very coasting trade,” a lawmaker in Virginia had seethed, refer-
ring to the commercial highway along the Atlantic coast, “is 
ruinous to the south.”173 “[I]t were as well for the coasting trade 
between Massachusetts and the Southern States to be abandoned 
at once,” another observer mused.174 
Compounding these concerns still further, by 1842, the legisla-
ture faced impending bankruptcy. Loans that the Commonwealth 
had issued to her sister states to help finance the revolutionary 
war remained unpaid, while profits from the sale of western lands 
that the Commonwealth had donated to the common treasury 
had been reallocated to the newly created western states.175 
Such was the state of affairs that in 1838, anxious lawmakers 
in Massachusetts set out to inventory every manufactured good 
within the state’s borders and assess the productivity of its soil.176 
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The results were troubling.177 “Vast amounts of money are now 
sent out of the State for bread,” the report declared.178 
These concerns for the financial health of the Commonwealth 
appeared alongside growing anxieties over its declining political 
influence. Owing to the Constitution’s rules apportioning political 
representatives in Congress, the steady expansion of the slave-
based agricultural sector promised to reduce the proportion of 
votes held by the commercial sector of New England. At a time 
when Massachusetts was still considered one of the large 
states,179 the draftsmen of the Constitution had agreed that any 
new member of the Union would be entitled to additional repre-
sentatives in Congress according to a classification long since ob-
solete in Massachusetts: “other persons” who are not free.180 It 
was only after one of Virginia’s most famous statesmen decided to 
purchase an extensive portion of the Mississippi River Valley from 
France in 1803 that his opponents in New England realized their 
mistake.181 Without “equal rights” in the Union, the Federalist-
dominated legislature of Massachusetts had declared, there 
would be only “ruin to themselves and posterity.”182 
To many in Boston, events in the nation’s capital seemed to con-
firm these long-standing worries for the declining Commonwealth. 
Beginning in January of 1842, news arrived from Washington of 
two potentially seismic shifts in the political and constitutional 
orders. The first of these developments occurred in the halls of 
Congress, the only place in the country where the representatives 
of the states and their citizens assembled under the same roof. 
For years, the elected representatives from Massachusetts had 
enjoyed the privilege of being among the first to present their pe-
titions to the nation’s lawmakers. According to custom, the roll call 
for members of Congress followed the geography of the Atlantic 
coastline, such that the New England states always preceded the 
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southern states.183 But beginning in the late 1830s, when Adams 
refused to comply with the House rule barring the prohibition of 
petitions against slavery, the speaker had shifted the order, such 
that Massachusetts was called last—or not at all.184 
Then, toward the end of January in 1842, shortly after Adams 
introduced a petition from his constituents calling for a disso-
lution of the Union, representatives from Virginia proposed a 
vote of censure that would expel Adams from the House alto-
gether. Although remembered as a great nationalist, Adams by 
then had become a symbol of Massachusetts. After eight years 
in Congress, his colleagues referred to him as the “gentleman 
from Massachusetts.”185 Indeed, Adams himself charged that the 
House rule that barred him from speaking out against slavery 
constituted an abridgement not only of his rights, but also of the 
rights of the state of Massachusetts.186 According to Adams, his 
best defense against censure lay in providing proof that the south-
ern states had violated the State Citizenship Clause of Article IV—
and hence, justified his constituents who had petitioned Congress 
to formally dissolve the Union.187 
While Adams began compiling evidence for this Article IV de-
fense, word arrived in Boston of a second turn of events: a lawsuit 
in the US Supreme Court that promised to disrupt the increas-
ingly fragile promise of legal equality between the states.188 For 
much of the preceding four decades, disputes over the scope of the 
obligations that one state owed another state under Article IV 
had been met with well-worn customs of diplomacy, as state leg-
islatures composed resolutions requesting the return of particu-
lar individuals claimed as slaves or free men, and state execu-
tives carried out the actual work of securing their return.189 Now, 
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however, the states of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had 
decided to abandon this practice of ad hoc diplomacy and take 
their Article IV dispute concerning the meaning of the Fugitive 
Slave Clause to what some referred to as the “Supreme Court 
room.”190 In doing so, they all but ensured that the informal prac-
tice of interstate negotiations would be replaced with a bright-line 
constitutional rule assigning a new set of unilateral obligations 
under the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV—obligations with 
no corollary obligations under the State Citizenship Clause of 
Article IV.191 
To lawmakers in Boston, this pending Article IV litigation, 
compounded with the silencing of its most famous spokesperson 
in Congress, necessitated some form of response. That February, 
under the leadership of Adams’s son, Charles—then a first-time 
state senator—the legislature of Massachusetts took the unprec-
edented step of organizing a lawsuit designed to challenge the 
constitutionality of the police laws of the plantation coast. In 
doing so, they borrowed from a model of dispute resolution that 
had first emerged in the Atlantic maritime world of nations and 
that they now tailored for a North American continent of erupting 
states. As Adams and his peers would have been well aware, in 
1789, the inaugural Congress of the new republic had sought to 
develop a judicial framework by which it could remedy wrongs its 
citizens had inflicted on the citizens of another nation—and 
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thereby avoid military conflict with more powerful foreign na-
tions.192 By enacting the Alien Tort Statute, Congress had hoped 
to accomplish this goal, by opening the federal courts to citizens 
of foreign nations who had been injured by citizens of the United 
States.193 Well versed in the practices of international law, Adams 
and his colleagues now borrowed this basic structure in an at-
tempt to secure the state’s sovereignty, while ensuring that the 
brewing dispute with its more powerful trade partners along the 
Atlantic coast did not escalate into war. 
To begin with, when Adams began to draft the paperwork 
that would authorize a state-sponsored legal challenge to proceed, 
he was quick to set aside the older precedents of national citizen-
ship. Indeed, although a group of black activists had submitted a 
petition protesting the same laws in question just a month earlier 
using the old category of American citizenship,194 Adams made no 
reference to any such arguments.195 Instead, Adams framed the 
lawsuit as one that hinged on the “imprisonment of any citizen of 
Massachusetts . . . within the borders of other States of the Union.”196 
Adams’s colleagues were even more explicit that the goal of the 
lawsuit had less to do with securing the promise of national citi-
zenship for free blacks than it did with vindicating the sovereign 
status of the Commonwealth in the orderly forum of federal court. 
When members of the state senate reviewed Adams’s proposal for 
commencing the suit on March 1, 1842, for example, the conver-
sation centered on the need to “discharge all our constitutional 
obligations to the South, but at the same time to maintain our 
own rights with firmness.”197 According to the reporter who ob-
served these legislative debates, “[A]ll agreed that it was becom-
ing the high character of our Commonwealth to take this matter 
under its special charge.”198 
This same concern for maintaining the rights of the 
Commonwealth was also apparent in the memos that merchants 
outside the State House drafted that spring, as they too urged the 
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need for an Article IV lawsuit. At the helm of this lobbying effort 
was a merchant named John Ingersoll Bowditch,199 who main-
tained a regular correspondence with the merchant houses of 
New Orleans200 and who owned several ships in the coasting 
trade.201 Shortly after the Supreme Court published its much an-
ticipated Article IV decision in March of 1842—one that, as ex-
pected, had imposed unilateral limits on the police power of free 
states under the Fugitive Slave Clause202—Bowditch submitted a 
petition to a friend in Congress, asking for help in ensuring that 
a State Citizenship Clause lawsuit would be allowed to proceed in 
federal court.203 “Be pleased to glance at the names of the signers,” 
Bowditch advised, “and assure yourself that they are men who 
have a real and deep interest in all that concerns the commerce of 
the country.”204 Their goals, he continued in a separate letter, 
“ought not to be connected in the minds of any one with the abolition 
question.”205 
The politicians in Washington who looked over these memo-
rials were equally clear that the aim of a lawsuit was less about 
securing the national rights of free blacks than of securing the 
sovereign status of Massachusetts. According to Senator Robert 
Winthrop, a corollary Article IV State Citizenship Clause case 
was needed to restore the constitutional logic of reciprocity and 
create an equivalent limit on the police power of slave states. As 
Winthrop explained: 
If the police power of a [free] State cannot be permitted to 
divest a master of his constitutional right over his slave, . . . 
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as little can it be suffered to divest a free citizen of his consti-
tutional right over himself, his own actions, and his own mo-
tions, as guaranteed by the other.206 
Indeed, Justice Story may well have envisioned precisely this 
type of State Citizenship Clause lawsuit when he drafted the 
Prigg opinion: in December of 1842, just months after issuing the 
opinion, his son’s name appeared on the memorial calling for an 
Article IV test case.207 
Even the timing and structure of the lawsuit pointed to the 
primacy of concerns for vindicating the state’s sovereign status. 
Although Adams drafted the resolution authorizing the governor 
to organize a lawsuit in February of 1842, no action was taken on 
the matter until the following spring, after a set of resolutions had 
arrived from Savannah declaring that the legislature of Georgia 
would never recognize the citizenship laws of Massachusetts. “It 
has not heretofore been the desire, or the policy of Massachusetts, 
to make complaint of the violation of her rights by other States,” 
Adams wrote in a report authorizing the governor to take the ad-
ditional step of appointing state agents to travel southward and 
organize a lawsuit.208 Perhaps even more striking, when the gov-
ernor finally did appoint lawyers to represent the state, he ig-
nored a proposal from the abolitionists to appoint a lawyer well 
known for his commitment to social justice,209 and instead ap-
pointed a Charleston-based lawyer who had previously expressed 
his willingness to help “prevent any rupture of those friendly re-
lations which subsist between Charleston & Boston,”210 as well as 
a Massachusetts judge who had family friends in Charleston.211 
In those uncertain times, this envisioned federal lawsuit 
promised an elegant solution to the need for Massachusetts to ful-
fill its sovereign duty of protection and restore a rule of Article IV 
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reciprocity, albeit without compromising the trade relations with 
the plantation South. Originating in the same logic that had first 
inspired the opening of the federal courts to international disputes, 
the lawsuit would have provided a respectable means of safeguard-
ing the free movement of ships along the corridor.212 At the same 
time, a hearing in the Supreme Court room promised to help re-
store the state’s reputation abroad: solidifying Massachusetts’s 
status not as a nearly bankrupt government at risk of being ex-
cluded “from the pale of civilization,”213 but rather as a proud sov-
ereign no less capable of protecting her citizens than the ancient 
Roman Empire or the powerful British Empire. And for forward-
thinking lawmakers like Charles Francis Adams—men who had 
long counted themselves sympathetic to the plight of free blacks—
albeit, unwilling to interfere with the laws of slavery—the lawsuit 
provided a means of realizing the Commonwealth’s founding 
creed that all men were created equal.214 
Despite these hoped-for results, the search for a federal forum 
would be another two decades in the making. Not long after the 
state’s lawyers arrived in Charleston and New Orleans to begin 
proceedings, they ran headlong into the fury of those who had en-
acted the police laws upholding the pillars of slavery. Within a 
week, Charleston’s politicians had gathered in the South Carolina 
State House and passed a set of resolutions ordering the immedi-
ate expulsion of Massachusetts’s agent.215 Within months, the leg-
islature of Louisiana had followed suit, prompting those in Boston 
to wonder aloud as to how best to safeguard the state’s sovereign 
status, in a land where their trade partners appeared to have 
closed the door to the courthouse. 
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B. The Rise of State Citizenship as a Constitutional Norm 
In the immediate aftermath of the expulsion of the state’s 
lawyers, the abolitionists and politicians who had engineered the 
Article IV lawsuit called for a robust response on the part of the 
state. Citing the flagrant breach of the State Citizenship Clause, 
the most radical among them urged the state legislature to sever 
legal relations with the offending states—even if it meant a resort 
to arms. Unable to secure the votes in the State House needed for 
such a dramatic response, these activists instead turned to the 
court of public opinion. In formal resolutions, petitions, and 
speeches, they drew upon the state’s sovereign duty of protection 
to first defend the state’s appeal to the Supreme Court before in-
voking the same duty to call for state legislation that would pro-
tect state citizens from the reach of federal statutes. Though 
largely forgotten today, this public campaign ensured that, rather 
than simply morphing into national citizenship, the category of 
state citizenship remained a distinct category in constitutional 
discourse—one widely understood to carry a duty of protection 
that would be fulfilled not on the battlefield, but in federal 
court.216 
The proposal to sever legal relations with South Carolina 
first appeared in a committee room in the Massachusetts State 
House in January of 1845, where the leading architect of the cam-
paign for a federal hearing, Charles Francis Adams, proposed a 
dissolution of legal relations.217 Following the same reasoning 
that his father had offered when he presented a petition for the 
dissolution of the Union in 1842, Adams now argued that the fail-
ure of South Carolina to recognize the State Citizenship Clause, 
coupled with the state’s refusal to adjudicate the controversy in 
the Supreme Court, rendered Massachusetts exempt from having 
to fulfill any of its Article IV obligations. “Discussions took three 
hours,” Adams confided to his diary. “At the point where the 
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Massachusetts people are considered as absolved from their obli-
gations to [South Carolina], which makes the gist of the paper, we 
came to a dead standstill. The committee are against me,” he 
wrote.218 
Unable to secure the votes needed for a formal dissolution of 
relations, Adams instead took his case to the public forum. In a re-
markable document modeled on the Declaration of Independence, 
Adams began by compiling a list of grievances against South 
Carolina, focusing not on the wrongs that the state had done to 
black men as Americans, but rather on the wrongs done to the sov-
ereignty of the state. “Massachusetts [ ] arraigns South Carolina,” 
he wrote, for enacting laws “aggressive upon the rights of her 
sister States.”219 “Massachusetts denies [South Carolina’s] right 
. . . to arrogate to herself a right of jurisdiction over the ships of 
Massachusetts, or condemning her citizens without appeal.”220 
Massachusetts, he proclaimed, “will never relax in her demand of 
all the rights which belong to her as a State and a member of the 
Union.”221 
In presenting this argument, Adams made use of the then-
familiar concepts of sovereignty to justify Massachusetts’s right 
to challenge the constitutionality of the laws in federal court. “It 
is not [ ] as ‘citizens of the United States,’ as the State of South 
Carolina pretends, but because they are citizens of Massachusetts, 
that this State claims the guaranty of the Constitution of the 
United States to protect her people against wrong in the harbors 
of Carolina,” Adams wrote, invoking the ancient duty of protec-
tion.222 Having defended the state’s course of action as the core of 
state sovereignty, Adams then left open the possibility that South 
Carolina had effectively breached the terms of constitutional 
union. “It becomes, then, a solemn question,” Adams warned, 
“whether South Carolina . . . has not voluntarily forfeited all title 
to insist upon the execution by the citizens of Massachusetts of those 
other provisions [of Article IV] by which she peculiarly benefits.”223 
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Adams was by no means the only voice to urge a dissolution 
of Article IV relations. In towns and cities across the state, aboli-
tionists seized on the logic of state sovereignty to call for an im-
mediate phase of “commercial and political non-intercourse”—
even if it meant armed warfare.224 “Have not South Carolina and 
Louisiana declared war against Massachusetts?” Garrison 
roared in Marlboro Chapel.225 Reciting the same logic etched out 
in the treatises of Pufendorf and Vattel, abolitionists in one 
small Massachusetts town proclaimed that the expulsion by South 
Carolina constituted an “indignity cast upon . . . the Executive of 
this State, and on us, citizens of Massachusetts.”226 In Boston, 
meanwhile, black abolitionists drafted a set of resolutions calling 
for the legislature to sever ties with South Carolina—not to se-
cure their rights of national citizenship, but to “vindicate the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth,—her self-respect and 
honor,—her freedom, independence and sovereignty as a State,—
the rights of all her people as equally sacred.”227 Even those who 
questioned the wisdom of picking a fight with the state’s leading 
trade partner invoked the duty of protection. “Let us [ ] stand 
upon our rights,” an editorial proclaimed, “[and] assert it as our 
duty to afford protection to our citizens.”228 
Despite these mounting calls for action, the state legislature 
refused to sever legal relations with the governments at the other 
end of the commercial corridor. In March of 1845, the legislature 
voted to publish a formal set of resolves announcing the immedi-
ate end to all “further present action in behalf of her citizens im-
prisoned in South Carolina.”229 To those who reflected on the rea-
sons for this abrupt halt, the answer seemed to lay in the realities 
of commerce. As Story, one of the state’s most well-regarded 
jurists, explained in a letter to a friend, “Considering our position 
as a commercial State,” he reasoned, “it is a very difficult and del-
icate matter.”230 Others concurred, noting the deep financial ties 
that linked the Boston merchants to the plantation coast. As one 
editor pointed out, at a time when “slave mortgages were being 
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foreclosed in favor of Boston merchants, and while the profits of 
slave agriculture were flowing into the pockets of Boston gentle-
men,” Massachusetts had yet to free herself from slavery.231 The 
“Boston merchants,” Ralph Waldo Emerson observed in his jour-
nal, “would willingly salve the matter over.”232 
Unwilling to risk jeopardizing these trade relations with 
Charleston and New Orleans, members of the state legislature 
and executive branch instead refocused their efforts on prying 
open the door to the federal courthouse. Drawing on the language 
of sovereignty that had already reverberated through the press 
that spring, they sought to defend the state’s search for a federal 
forum as part of its sovereign duties of protection. In a widely 
publicized executive message addressed to the legislature, for ex-
ample, the governor argued that Massachusetts had followed a 
“respectful and constitutional course.”233 The state, he reasoned, 
had simply sought “to aid her defenceless citizens to seek a legal 
redress in the highest judicial tribunal of the Union, for serious 
wrongs done them.”234 Failure to use “every constitutional means 
within her power” to protect these citizens, he argued, would ren-
der the state “unworthy the position which she now holds among 
her sister States.”235 
In a resolution drafted that March and submitted to the 
state’s representatives in Washington, meanwhile, state lawmak-
ers followed the governor’s recommendation and urged Congress 
to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction, thereby allowing citi-
zens of the state to gain access to the courts.236 “[A]ll that the citi-
zens of Massachusetts ask,” one congressman argued in Congress, 
“is[ ] that one of these cases may be brought before the Supreme 
Court.”237 Massachusetts, another senator echoed, had “thought it 
to be her duty to institute some means of . . . causing a judicial 
investigation.”238 Access to the Court, the senator explained, was 
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due not to the people of America, but “due to Massachusetts, and 
other States which have similar causes of complaint.”239 
As lawmakers continued to lobby for greater access to the fed-
eral courts in Washington, back in Boston, the emerging coalition 
of abolitionists and antislavery politicians who confronted the so-
bering reality that there would be no warships dispatched to 
Charleston began to shift their focus from targeting the laws of 
the southern states to the laws of the federal government. Using 
the now-dominant language of state citizenship and its corollary 
of state sovereignty, they set out to secure the enactment of a 
state statute that would afford procedural protections to those de-
nied the protections of the national government. Focusing first on 
the federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793240 that denied men and 
women of their liberty with only the slenderest guarantees of due 
process, and then the revised Fugitive Slave Law of 1850241 that 
authorized federal officers to assist in seizing any individuals 
claimed as slaves,242 abolitionists and their allies in the State 
House drew upon the principles of sovereignty to erect a new 
sanctuary within the state’s jurisdiction. 
In the autumn of 1842, for example, following the arrest and 
imprisonment of a black man on the streets of Boston at the be-
hest of a Virginia slaveholder, abolitionists took to the printing 
press to argue that the state’s failure to afford judicial process 
for its citizens constituted an abdication of sovereignty. “[F]or 
Massachusetts to submit to the outrage . . . is to place the land of 
Lexington . . . in the condition of a conquered province,” declared 
one resolution from 1842.243 To submit to such an outrage, another 
editorial declared, would be to destroy the Commonwealth’s 
global reputation. “The burning shame of the pity and contempt of 
Europe,” the writer warned, “will fall upon this Commonwealth, 
unless it protests against these threatened abominations.”244 
In the State House, meanwhile, those who sought to justify 
the state’s newly enacted laws protecting people of color from the 
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enforcement of this federal law did so not by asserting the state’s 
autonomy from the national government, but rather by invoking 
the ancient duties of protection to its citizens. In the autumn of 
1846, for example, John Quincy Adams defended the state’s new 
Personal Liberty Law245 using the same basic principles of sov-
ereignty that his son had used to justify the state’s role in pro-
tecting a citizen’s rights in federal court.246 “It is a question,” 
Adams declared, “whether this commonwealth is to maintain its 
independence as a state or not. It is a question,” he continued, 
“whether your and my native commonwealth is capable of protect-
ing the men who are under its laws, or not.”247 A decade later, 
Boston’s lawmakers invoked the same arguments to again justify 
the state’s extension of procedural protections, insisting that the 
states had “never parted with their fundamental principles of 
sovereignty . . . the right and duty to protect the rights and liberties 
of its citizens and subjects.”248 
At a time of deeply uncertain territorial borders, this logic of 
sovereignty as a duty to protect—whether it be through litigation in 
federal court or the enactment of state statutes—became part of eve-
ryday parlance, reflected in the words of the state’s leading essayists 
and preachers. “May God help us so to redeem this oppressed and 
bleeding State,” a pastor proclaimed on a cloudless June afternoon 
in 1854, in a church at the heart of the Commonwealth, heads low-
ered before him, palms closed.249 “[I]f Massachusetts is merely a 
conquered province under martial law . . . then I wish to know it,” 
the pastor continued.250 “Massachusetts, once the proud, inde-
pendent, free and brave old Commonwealth, respected abroad, 
revered at home, the pride of the nation . . . how art thou fallen! 
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[W]hat is thy reputation now?” one editorial asked.251 “The whole 
military force of the State is at the service of . . . a slaveholder 
from Virginia,” Henry David Thoreau declared in 1854, following 
yet another arrest of a black man on the streets of Boston.252 The 
Commonwealth, the editorial continued, was “[c]overed with dis-
grace,” and the “laughing-stock of the world.”253 
As rumors began to escalate in the late 1850s that South 
Carolina intended to sever all its ties with the Commonwealth, 
this discourse of state citizenship and its corollary duty of protec-
tion became the default language of protest in Boston—the lens 
through which observers described the rapidly fraying constitu-
tional union. When, for example, word arrived in 1857 that the 
US Supreme Court had at last agreed to hear the question 
whether a person of color could gain access to the federal court-
house, observers in Boston framed the case not in the language of 
national citizenship for African Americans, but in the language of 
state citizenship. As one Boston commentator explained as the 
city awaited news of the decision, if the Court ruled that a black 
man named Dred Scott was a citizen of the state for the purposes 
of bringing a lawsuit in federal court, then he would also be a citi-
zen of the state under the State Citizenship Clause of Article IV.254 
And if, on the other hand, he was not a citizen of the state, as 
Chief Justice Taney later held,255 then the state itself would cease 
to exist. As a memorial from the city’s black abolitionists pub-
lished in January of 1859 explained, the Dred Scott decision had 
done more than simply declare that people of color were not na-
tional citizens: it had effectively denied the state of its sover-
eignty.256 “If we are not citizens of Massachusetts,” the memorial 
declared, “then the Commonwealth is without citizens.”257 Perhaps 
there was no need to elaborate further; no need to say what had 
already been repeated for decades: that if the Commonwealth was 
without citizens, the Commonwealth was no different than a tract 
of barren land on the Atlantic coast. 
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memorial from the “colored citizens” of Massachusetts that had been presented to the 
legislature). 
 257 Id (first emphasis added and second emphasis in original). 
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To those who had witnessed the rise of this way of speaking—
a way of speaking that had first emerged twenty-five years earlier 
with the young activists who assembled in the meeting halls of 
Boston, before ascending into the daily discourse of politicians 
and essayists and preachers alike—it would thus have come as no 
surprise to hear the words people used when, in late 1860, news 
arrived of South Carolina’s secession, signaling what some pre-
dicted to be the unraveling of the United States. It would have 
come as no surprise, for example, that when the governor of 
Massachusetts addressed the legislature to call for the first mo-
bilization of troops to preserve the Union, he spoke of the sover-
eign duties of Massachusetts and her determined yet failed at-
tempt to protect the rights of her citizens in federal court.258 Nor, 
moreover, would it have come as a surprise that when the com-
manding officer who would lead the raw recruits from Boston 
down to the battlefield, he addressed them not only as Americans, 
but as citizens of Massachusetts.259 “We go forth . . . to do our 
duty,” the officer proclaimed on the eve of battle. “[W]e shall go 
feeling that we are citizens of the proud old commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.”260 
Theirs was a way of speaking that had emerged from a time 
and place in American history now lost from view, when people 
determined to be heard set aside older arguments premised on 
national citizenship and instead invoked the novel category of 
state citizenship. Owing to the exigencies of grassroots organizing 
and growing concerns for the once leading state of the Union, by 
the eve of the Civil War, state citizenship had become something 
far more than simply a placeholder for national citizenship. In-
stead, it had come to represent a status that carried with it a duty 
 
 258 See John A. Andrew, Inaugural Address of His Excellency John A. Andrew, in 
1861 Mass Acts 565, 584 (referring to prior attempts at resolution in court); 1861 Mass 
Acts at 566 (“In a spirit and with the purpose of justice towards all other peoples and 
States, our immediate and official obligations are mainly due to that ancient and be-
loved Commonwealth, in whose service we are assembled.”); 1861 Mass Acts at 591 (con-
cluding his discussion of the impending conflict by noting that “Massachusetts demands, 
and has a right to demand, that her sister States shall likewise respect the constitu-
tional rights of her citizens within their limits” and referring to the South Carolina and 
Massachusetts controversy). See also Henry Wilson, Response of Col. Wilson, in Frank 
Moore, ed, 3 The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events 174, 174 (G.P. Putnam 1862). 
 259 See John Lord Parker, Henry Wilson’s Regiment: History of the Twenty-Second 
Massachusetts Infantry, the Second Company Sharpshooters, and the Third Light Battery, 
in the War of the Rebellion 26 (Rand Avery 1887) (describing the scene at Boston Commons 
and the threat of rain). 
 260 Wilson, Response of Col. Wilson at 174 (cited in note 258). 
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of protection on the part of the state—a duty said to define the 
very essence of what it meant to be a government of the people. 
III.  LEGACIES: RETHINKING STATE CITIZENSHIP AND 
SOVEREIGNTY 
In the immediate aftermath of America’s Civil War, when the 
nation’s politicians assembled in Washington and began the work 
of building a new republic free from slavery, they hammered a 
phrase into the Fourteenth Amendment that would have made all 
the sense in the world to them: citizens of the state.261 As a result 
of the tendency to focus on the amendment’s creation of national 
citizenship, we have only a hazy sense of how and why this phrase 
came to be included in the Constitution’s guarantee of due pro-
cess—much less of the role that state citizenship might play in 
today’s modern era of rights protection. Scholars who have ven-
tured an explanation for the inclusion of state citizenship have 
helpfully pointed out that it provided a supplemental prohibition 
against state discrimination, as well as a technical means of pre-
serving diversity jurisdiction under Article III.262 
But as this Part argues, the category of state citizenship in-
scribed in the Fourteenth Amendment represented more than 
simply an additional prohibition on state discrimination or a 
means of securing diversity jurisdiction. In particular, a return to 
the legislative records suggests that lawmakers across the politi-
cal spectrum understood state citizenship as a status that carried 
with it a sovereign duty of protection by the state—a duty that 
could coexist easily alongside the national government’s duties of 
protection. Recovering this understanding of state citizenship and 
state sovereignty as an additive source of protection, rather than 
 
 261 US Const Amend XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States 
wherein they reside.”). For the role of the Fourteenth Amendment in securing the promises 
of emancipation, see William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Prin-
ciple to Judicial Doctrine 110–47 (Harvard 1988). 
 262 See, for example, Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and 
Comity 342 (North Carolina 1981) (arguing that the inclusion of state citizenship provided 
a supplemental prohibition against state discrimination); Paul Finkelman, Original Intent 
and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole of Constitutional Law, 89 Chi Kent L 
Rev 1019, 1037 (2014) (same); Peter J. Spiro, Beyond Citizenship: American Identity after 
Globalization 53 (Oxford 2008) (arguing that the inclusion of state citizenship prevented 
a state from denying “state citizenship on the basis of race”); Richard A. Epstein, Of Citi-
zens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1 NYU J L & Liberty 334, 340 (2005) (suggesting that the inclusion of state 
citizenship may have been intended to preserve diversity jurisdiction). 
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an antagonistic sphere of government, in turn provides a useful 
set of resources for thinking through open questions of law and 
policy today. 
A. The Place of State Citizenship in the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
When the nation’s lawmakers assembled in Washington after 
the war, they confronted an America in which the brutal end to 
slavery on the battlefield seemed to mean little in practice. Re-
ports had begun to arrive from the Mississippi River Valley, de-
scribing the horrific carnage unfolding in the abandoned planta-
tions and towns of the former Confederacy. Armed men, no longer 
soldiers, had set out into the night, leaving their victims to hang 
from the trees.263 In the train cars lolling through the scorched 
fields of Georgia, white men tallied up the death rate. One in 
every four black people had died since the previous January, a 
planter estimated to his traveling companion, and there was still 
more dying to be done.264 
In the nation’s capital, politicians who had dedicated their 
lives to ending the regime of slavery considered their options. 
There were no legal grounds for military intervention, their crit-
ics said; the war was over.265 Nor were there men or money enough 
to ensure adequate protection in the quiet enclaves of the planta-
tions, far removed from the federal outposts left over from the 
war.266 Indeed, even the most visionary of reformers recognized 
the limits of the reach of the federal government. “The arm of the 
 
 263 See, for example, Miscellaneous, Philadelphia Press (Jan 21, 1866) (“Abe McGee, 
a negro, went to the house of his former master, in Panola county, Mississippi, and took 
therefrom his own child. He was followed by William McGee, a son of his late master, and 
shot dead.”). 
 264 The Loyal South, Chicago Republican (Jan 19, 1866): 
Said a planter to me, while sitting beside him on the cars: “One fourth of the 
negro population of this State have died since the first of last January, and an-
other one fourth will miserably perish this winter, from starvation and expo-
sure.” As he told me this, he rolled the information under his tongue as if it were 
a rich morsel. 
 265 See John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History 314–
22 (Free Press 2012). 
 266 For information on the spatial limits of US military power in the South, see Gregory 
P. Downs and Scott Nesbit, Zones of Occupation, September 1866, in Mapping Occupation: 
Force, Freedom, and the Army in Reconstruction, archived at http://perma.cc/3G5Y 
-2TZE. See also Steven Hahn, A Nation under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the 
Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration 265–313 (Harvard 2003) (describing the 
campaigns of paramilitary violence that engulfed the rural South following the Civil War). 
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federal government is long,” Frederick Douglass observed that 
spring, “but it is far too short to protect the rights of individuals 
in the interior of distant States.”267 
Facing the prospect of a de facto return to the institution of 
slavery, leading members of the Republican Party who turned to 
amending the text of the nation’s Constitution looked to the past 
for solutions that could help mitigate the violence. Throughout 
the legislative debates that culminated with the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, these lawmakers routinely invoked the 
specific history that lies at the heart of this Article: a history de-
fined not by the elusive search of northerners for national citizen-
ship for free blacks, but rather by the decades-long search by a 
state government to protect its citizens—and thus, preserve its 
sovereignty—in the halls of the country’s federal courts. 
Perhaps most notably, when the lead architect of the 
Fourteenth Amendment presented his opening arguments to 
Congress in January of 1866 for an amendment that would secure 
the fragile promise of freedom, he began not by discussing the in-
ability of Congress to protect its citizens, but rather by reciting 
the inability of Massachusetts to protect its citizens in federal 
court. “Time was, within the memory of every man now within 
hearing of my voice,” Congressman John Bingham of Ohio re-
called, “when it was entirely unsafe for a citizen of Massachusetts 
or Ohio who was known to be the friend of the human race . . . to 
be found anywhere in the streets of Charleston or in the streets of 
Richmond.”268 Turning to the State Citizenship Clause, Bingham 
then explicitly reminded his listeners of South Carolina’s expul-
sion of Massachusetts’s agent.269 It was only after invoking this 
collective memory that Bingham urged his colleagues to expand 
the rules of federal jurisdiction. “If the tribunals of South Carolina 
will not respect the rights of the citizens of Massachusetts,” he 
declared, “I desire to see the Federal Judiciary clothed with the 
power to take cognizance of the question, and assert those rights 
by solemn judgment, inflicting upon the offenders such penalties 
as will compel a decent respect for this guarantee to all the citi-
zens of every State.”270 
 
 267 Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction, Atlantic Monthly 50 (Dec 1866). 
 268 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 36 Cong Globe 157 (Jan 9, 1866) (“Bingham Speech”). See 
also Reconstruction: Speech of Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio, Cincinnati Daily Gazette 
(Jan 16, 1866) (reprinting the speech in full). 
 269 Bingham Speech, 39th Cong, 1st Sess at 158 (cited in note 268). 
 270 Id. 
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This shared memory of a state’s failed efforts to protect its 
citizens through litigation coursed through the legislative de-
bates, appearing on at least thirteen separate occasions.271 When, 
for example, Congressman John Sherman of Ohio explained the 
reason why members of Congress had voted to give Congress 
power to open the federal courts to former enslaved men and 
women, he did so by once again invoking Massachusetts’s deter-
mined efforts to defend its citizens in federal court.272 Likewise, 
when Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois shortly thereafter de-
fended an early draft of the Civil Rights Act that expanded the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, he twice reminded his listeners 
of the time when state authorities from Massachusetts had tried 
to test the constitutionality of the police laws in court,273 as did 
his colleague, Senator Henry Wilson.274 Congressman John 
Broomall of Pennsylvania, meanwhile, echoed this history as he 
too argued for the passage of a federal law that would expand the 
federal courts’ jurisdiction. “Strange as it may seem,” Broomall 
observed, “[Congress] had no power to protect the personal liberty 
of the agent of the State of Massachusetts in the city of Charleston, 
or enable him to sue in the State courts.”275 
In addition to repeatedly citing this infamous history of a state’s 
determined attempt to protect its citizenry, lawmakers across the 
political spectrum made clear that the march of Lincoln’s armies 
had not extinguished the sovereign duty of states to protect their 
citizens.276 As Bingham emphasized and other scholars have since 
 
 271 See note 5. 
 272 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 36 Cong Globe 41 (Dec 13, 1865) (citing the “celebrated 
case of Mr. Hoar, who went to South Carolina[ ] . . . [and] was driven out, although he 
went there to exercise a plain constitutional right, and although he was a white man of 
undisputed character”). 
 273 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 36 Cong Globe 474 (Jan 29, 1866): 
Of what avail was it to the citizen of Massachusetts, who, a few years ago, went 
to South Carolina to enforce a constitutional right in court, that the Constitution 
of the United States declared that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? 
See also id at 475 (“[I]s it not manifest that it was competent for the Congress of the 
United States to have passed a law that would have protected Mr. Hoar, who went from 
Massachusetts to South Carolina for the purpose of testing a question in the courts?”). 
 274 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 36 Cong Globe Appx 142 (Mar 3, 1866). 
 275 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 36 Cong Globe 1263 (Mar 8, 1866) (emphasis added). 
 276 See Heyman, 41 Duke L Rev at 510 (cited in note 14) (arguing that “the members 
of the Thirty-Ninth Congress fully shared the classical view on the right to protection. . . . 
A central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to compel the states to fulfill this 
obligation, by incorporating it into the Federal Constitution and empowering the national 
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noted, the Fourteenth Amendment “was not intended to remove 
from the states ‘the care of the property, the liberty, and the life 
of the citizen.’”277 Instead, as Congressman Samuel Shellabarger 
of Ohio declared, it “was a ‘self-evident’ principle” that “‘protec-
tion by his Government is the right of every citizen.’”278 Others 
concurred. “[T]hese are the essential elements of citizenship,” de-
clared Congressman (later Senator) Justin Morrill of Vermont, 
“allegiance on [the] one side and protection on the other.”279 “The 
first duty of a government,” Senator Charles Sumner observed, 
without distinguishing between the national and state govern-
ments, “is protection.”280 
Opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment were particularly 
emphatic that the duty of protection belonged exclusively to the 
state governments. According to these lawmakers, “‘all the ar-
rangements of life with regard to the protection of property and 
person’” were “exclusively committed to the states.”281 As one 
Republican from New York argued, the states were peculiarly 
well placed to police the personal rights of their citizenry. “[T]he 
extent of . . . the protection of personal rights,” he explained, “we 
owe to . . . the fact that the functions of government with which 
the citizen has immediate relation are brought home to him, 
that he operates immediately upon them and they immediately 
upon him.”282 
To be sure, these invocations of a regime in which states had 
a duty of protection did not contravene efforts to create a greater 
role for Congress in protecting the rights of freedmen. In drafting 
the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,283 for example, Republican 
 
government to enforce it”). See also id at 546 (arguing that “[i]n accordance with the ante-
bellum tradition, members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress regarded the right to protection 
as axiomatic”). 
 277 Id at 557, quoting 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 36 Cong Globe 1292 (Mar 9, 1866). 
 278 Heyman, 41 Duke L Rev at 546 (cited in note 14), quoting 39th Cong, 1st Sess at 
1293 (cited in note 277). 
 279 Heyman, 41 Duke L Rev at 546 (cited in note 14), quoting 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 
36 Cong Globe 570 (Feb 1, 1866). 
 280 Speech of Hon. Charles Sumner, Delivered in the Senate of the United States, 
Friday, January 18, 1867, Wash Rptr (Jan 30, 1867). For other invocations of the duty of 
protection, see Supreme Court of Indiana: Highly Important Decision, Cincinnati Daily 
Gazette (Nov 2, 1866) (listing “[p]rotection by the Government” as the first principle 
“which belong[s] of right to the citizens of all free governments”). See also M.B.C. True, 
Protection to Home Industry, Anamosa Eurkea (Mar 29, 1866). 
 281 Heyman, 41 Duke L Rev at 547 (cited in note 14), quoting 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 
36 Cong Globe 1123 (Mar 1, 1866) (statement of Rep Rogers). 
 282 39th Cong, 1st Sess, in 36 Cong Globe 1065 (Feb 27, 1866) (statement of Rep Hale). 
 283 14 Stat 27, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1981 et seq. 
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lawmakers took care to create a new arm of the federal bureau-
cracy whose civil servants would be charged with prosecuting 
civil-rights violations in federal court.284 But as the repeated ref-
erences to a state’s duty of protection in the legislative history 
cited above suggests,285 the architects of these new institutions did 
not view them as establishing a monopoly over the arena of rights 
protection in the new America. 
As the Supreme Court infamously explained in its 1873 deci-
sion in the Slaughter-House Cases,286 “It is quite clear [ ] that 
there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of 
a State, which are distinct from each other.”287 Indeed, when 
Bingham, the lead drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, re-
flected on the meaning of the amendment’s state and national cit-
izenship provisions in 1871, he too explained that the amendment 
had preserved both categories: 
The words “citizens of the United States,” and “citizens of the 
States,” as employed in the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, did 
not change or modify the relations of citizens of the State and 
nation as they existed under the original Constitution.288 
These long-standing relations, Bingham argued, rested on the 
most basic principle of sovereignty: “the reciprocal obligation of 
allegiance on the one side and protection on the other.”289 
B. The Place of State Citizenship and State Sovereignty Today 
In addition to offering a more granular view of America’s con-
stitutional past, this history provides resources for working 
through one of the enduring issues in constitutional law: the place 
of the states in American governance.290 As this Section argues, 
 
 284 Civil Rights Act of 1866 §§ 3–4, 14 Stat at 27–28. 
 285 See notes 268–69 and accompanying text. 
 286 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873). 
 287 Id at 74. 
 288 HR Rep No 22, 41st Cong, 3d Sess 1 (Jan 30, 1871), reprinted in Congressional 
Reports on Woman Suffrage: The Majority and Minority Reports of the Judiciary Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives on the Woodhull Memorial 96, 96 (Woodhull, Claflin, & 
Co 1871). 
 289 Id. 
 290 For an example of the enduring quality of the issue between state and federal 
power, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the 
Future, 47 Vand L Rev 1563, 1563 (1994) (“The relationship between state and federal 
power has puzzled jurists since the nation began.”). See also New York v United States, 
505 US 144, 149 (1992) (describing questions over federal and state power as “perhaps our 
oldest question of constitutional law”). 
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although federalism’s past is often remembered for helping to sus-
tain “some of the most despicable institutions in American his-
tory,”291 the history of state citizenship presented here provides a 
dataset with which to “rethink what . . . state sovereignty should 
and do[es] mean today.”292 In particular, this history provides both 
a precedent for current state initiatives designed to protect indi-
viduals without national citizenship and a means of analyzing 
open questions in federal law, including the doctrinal rules gov-
erning when a state may sue the federal government or refuse to 
enforce federal law. 
As scholars have pointed out, over the past decade, a great 
deal of civil-rights innovation has been unfolding at the subna-
tional level.293 In statehouses across the country, advocates have 
proposed extending basic rights to those denied national citizen-
ship,294 while exercising the power of state institutions to challenge 
 
 291 See, for example, Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 Democracy 
J 37, 37 (Spring 2012) (observing that “States’ rights have been invoked to defend some of 
the most despicable institutions in American history, most notably slavery and Jim Crow” 
and warning that “it is a mistake to equate federalism’s past with its future”). 
 292 Gillian E. Metzger, The States as National Agents, 59 SLU L J 1071, 1073 (2015). 
For an early invitation to attend to the unique features of the states as governments, see 
Richard Briffault, What about the ‘Ism’?: Normative and Formal Concerns in Contempo-
rary Federalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1303, 1305–06 (1994). This Article’s proposal to broaden 
conceptions of state sovereignty to include the historical duties of protection owed by a 
government to its citizenry complements and extends both Professor Gillian E. Metzger’s 
and Professor Richard Briffault’s arguments that states have a role to play in America’s 
constitutional order precisely because they are “formally independent levels of govern-
ment.” Metzger, 59 SLU L J at 1072 (cited in note 292). 
 293 See, for example, Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Local Turn; Innovation and Diffu-
sion in Civil Rights Law, 79.3 L & Contemp Probs 115, 115 (2016) (observing that “[i]f one 
is looking for civil rights innovation, much of this innovation might be happening through 
legislation, regulatory frameworks, and policies adopted by state and local governments”). 
 294 See, for example, New York Is Home Act, New York SB 7879, 237th Sess (June 16, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E46G-FAVM (proposing the creation of state citizen-
ship); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan and Allan Colbern, The California Package: Immigrant 
Integration and the Evolving Nature of State Citizenship, 6 Policy Matters 1, 10–13 (Spring 
2015) (describing the creation of de facto state citizenship). 
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the reach of federal law through state-sponsored litigation,295 non-
enforcement policies,296 or formal state legislation.297 In the court-
room, meanwhile, members of the judiciary have signaled a will-
ingness to accommodate this more expansive role for the states: 
whether it be by opening the courthouse door to states seeking to 
challenge the federal government,298 articulating limits on the 
ability of the national government to compel state enforcement of 
federal law,299 or carving out room for state law to stand alongside 
federal law.300 
 
 295 For a summary of recent state challenges to the federal government, see Tara 
Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 Cornell L Rev 851, 872–80 
(2016). For a sampling of recent state-sponsored litigation against the federal government, 
see generally Petition for Review, New York v Environmental Protection Agency, Civil Ac-
tion No 17-1185 (DC Cir filed Aug 1, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Re-
lief, Massachusetts v Department of Education, Civil Action No 17-1331 (DDC filed July 6, 
2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 2875620); Brief for Appellants, Hawaii v Trump, 
Civil Action No 17-15589 (9th Cir filed Apr 7, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 
1338049); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Washington v Trump, Civil 
Action No 17-141 (WD Wash filed Jan 30, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 443297) 
(“Washington Complaint”). 
 296 See, for example, The Original List of Sanctuary Cities, USA (Ohio Jobs & Justice 
Political Action Committee, July 29, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/NB7W-BPYR; 
Bryan Griffith and Jessica Vaughan, Maps: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States (Center 
for Immigration Studies, July 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/VB2W-GLEE; Lunn 
v Massachusetts, 78 NE3d 1143 (Mass 2017). 
 297 See, for example, California Values Act, California SB 54, 2017–2018 Sess (Sept 
16, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Q7VY-RX6K; Oregon HB 2921, 79th Sess (Feb 15, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4YT6-B25K; New York SB 7879 (cited in note 294). See 
also Ann Morse, et al, Report on 2016 State Immigration Laws (National Conference of 
State Legislatures, Sept 1, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8H4H-GUFH; Tanya Broder, 
et al, Inclusive Policies Advance Dramatically in the States: Immigrants’ Access to Driver’s 
Licenses, Higher Education, Workers’ Rights, and Community Policing (National Immi-
gration Law Center, Aug 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/33DD-DA9M. 
 298 See Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency, 549 US 497, 518–20 (2007); 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 Colum 
L Rev 459, 494–95 (2012) (suggesting that “Massachusetts may suggest a broad role for 
states in challenging federal executive action—and federal executive inaction”); Calvin 
Massey, State Standing after Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 Fla L Rev 249, 264–66 (2009) (in-
terpreting the Massachusetts decision as one that stands for the proposition that “a state 
has standing to assert the rights of its residents under federal law”). 
 299 See New York, 505 US at 176–77; Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 935 (1997). 
See also Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 
Vand L Rev 1629, 1630–31 (2006) (arguing that the New York and Printz decisions 
“breathed new life” into the Tenth Amendment by, respectively, prohibiting Congress from 
ordering state legislatures to comply with federal instructions regulating waste and state 
executive officials from conducting background checks to enforce federal law). 
 300 See, for example, Altria Group, Inc v Good, 555 US 70, 91 (2008); Wyeth v Levine, 
555 US 555, 581 (2009); Cuomo v Clearing House Association, 557 US 519, 536 (2009); 
Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 Colum L Rev 1, 3 (2011) 
(arguing that these three decisions “limit administrative agencies’ preemption powers in 
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Despite this flurry of civil-rights innovation at the subna-
tional level, however, justifications for, and means of policing, this 
expansive role of states and cities have proven challenging.301 
Guided by conventional assumptions of state citizenship as a de-
funct category that gave way to national citizenship and confined 
to narrow definitions of state sovereignty made popular by south-
ern secessionists, members of the Court,302 state lawmakers,303 
 
ways that could have significant prospective effect in protecting state law against displace-
ment by executive branch actions”). But see Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textual-
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pong nature of the Court’s treatment of the antipreemption presumption”). 
 301 See Metzger, 111 Colum L Rev at 67 (cited in note 300) (“[While] [t]he idea that 
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Ohio St L J 1243, 1243 (2001) (arguing that members of the Rehnquist Court have “no 
common theory of federalism”); Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing State Sovereign 
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111 Colum L Rev at 19–25 (cited in note 300) (questioning whether traditional federalism 
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county and city officials,304 and academics305 have instead been left 
to justify and police such local action by invoking a government’s 
degree of formal autonomy from the national government or its 
reserved police powers under the Tenth Amendment. This con-
ception of state sovereignty as autonomy from the national gov-
ernment has, in turn, produced a host of doctrinal difficulties,306 
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“grant[s] the federal executive branch untrammeled discretion to punish state and local 
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(available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 515394) (“Plaintiff Cities have exercised their right of 
self-governance under state law to prohibit local law enforcement from considering immi-
gration status.”); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, City and 
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Order is a severe invasion of San Francisco’s sovereignty” because it “interferes with [the 
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eignty as a “state’s power to rule without interference over a policymaking domain of its 
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Federalism, 123 Yale L J 1996, 2000 (2014) (linking state sovereignty to autonomy); Grove, 
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prompting some scholars to propose abandoning the model of 
state sovereignty altogether.307 
The history that this Article has excavated provides a differ-
ent vantage point for thinking about state citizenship and state 
sovereignty. Although it is not within the scope of this Article to 
fully explore how this history can resolve open questions in law 
and policy, a brief survey suggests that at the very least, a recog-
nition of the historic role of the states in protecting the rights of 
noncitizens, as well as the traditional conception of state sover-
eignty as one measured not simply by the degree of autonomy 
from the national government, but by the duties owed to its peo-
ples, has the potential to broaden the terms of a conversation long 
cabined by the formal categories of federalism. 
Consider, for example, how this history might be brought to 
bear on state-level initiatives to secure protections for immi-
grants. Owing in part to the tendency to focus on national citizen-
ship as the source of rights protection, states have yet to fully em-
brace the potential leverage of state citizenship. To date, only one 
state government—New York—has considered a legislative pro-
posal to extend state citizenship to those within its borders.308 In 
California, meanwhile, efforts have focused on creating a de facto 
form of state citizenship, based not on a formal legislative grant 
of citizenship, but on a cumulative series of rights and privi-
leges.309 In both instances, advocates have had to rely on familiar 
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 307 See Heather K. Gerken, Sovereignty Is the Wrong Path for Federalism: A Response 
to Ilya Somin (Balkinization, Jan 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/N6HX-PR5A; 
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arguments premised on state autonomy, invoking the state’s re-
served powers of self-government to define the boundaries of its 
political community.310 
The history that lies at the heart of this Article suggests both 
a precedent for these initiatives and a different set of arguments 
to justify such proposals. As a purely descriptive matter, this his-
tory reveals  an attempt by one of America’s oldest states to pro-
tect the rights of those denied national citizenship—through for-
mal state resolutions of protest, as well as state-sponsored 
litigation in federal court. Far from resting simply on the oft-cited 
power of an autonomous government to define the boundaries of 
their citizenry,311 state actors predicated these interventions on a 
sovereign’s duty to protect its citizens’ fundamental rights—a 
duty that abolitionist lawyers strategically invoked to build an 
antislavery coalition, and one that subsequently informed the 
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which the category has 
remained hidden in the shadow of national citizenship. 
In addition to offering a precedent for these exercises of state 
power, this history also has the potential to enrich ongoing doc-
trinal debates in federal law, beginning with the current contro-
versy surrounding the rules governing when a state should be 
able to gain admission to the federal courthouse. Under its cur-
rent parens patriae state-standing doctrine, the Court has fash-
ioned a rule of admission that looks to whether a state has artic-
ulated an injury to one of its state “interests,” whether it be an 
injury to state-owned property, the state’s sphere of autonomous 
self-government, or the exercise of its general police powers.312 
Among its many difficulties,313 this rule risks divorcing the sub-
stantive injuries that plaintiff states cite in order to gain admis-
sion to the courtroom from the individual private rights that they 
hope to be adjudicated. 
To take but one example, in their recent efforts to gain a hear-
ing in the highest court of the nation, lawyers for the state of 
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Hawaii began their litigation against Executive Order 13780, also 
known as the “Travel Ban,” by citing the ways in which the Order 
infringed on the rights of the state’s Muslim residents.314 By the 
time the litigation reached the judges, however, this account of 
the injuries to private individuals had largely disappeared from 
the discussion. Working with the existing doctrine, counsel and 
the Ninth Circuit cited injuries to the state’s tourism industry 
and public universities, as measured by, among other facts, the 
equivalent of one fewer busload of tourists to the island and 
eleven fewer graduate students in the state’s public university.315 
By expanding this current doctrinal focus to encompass the 
foundational duty of a state to protect its citizens, this shift in 
vantage point could help generate a more transparent analysis 
of the issues to be adjudicated. Doing so might in turn mitigate 
separation-of-powers concerns by ensuring that the court’s prov-
ince remains solely “to decide on the rights of individuals,” as well 
as avoid the charade of citing highly attenuated injuries simply 
to gain admission to a federal forum.316 Although such a shift 
would represent a break with the current standing jurisprudence, 
it would arguably be consistent with the history of state citizen-
ship that drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment invoked, as well 
as some of the court’s earliest standing decisions. Perhaps most 
notably, in the Court’s foundational case Massachusetts v 
Mellon,317 a case most frequently cited as a prohibition on state 
suits against the federal government, the Court explicitly recog-
nized the possibility that a state could bring suit to protect its 
citizens from an unconstitutional federal law.318 
 
 314 Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hawaiʻi v 
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Adopting this more expansive concept of state sovereignty 
may also help generate a more transparent analysis of the private 
rights at stake in the anticommandeering context. As in the state-
standing cases, the Court has relied on invocations of a state’s au-
tonomy and reserved police powers to justify limits on Congress’s 
ability to compel enforcement of federal law by state officials.319 
And as in the standing context, this rule has generated a gap 
between the individual rights at stake and the constitutional 
analysis. To take one example, not unlike the lawyers for Hawaii, 
the city and county officials who have challenged the executive 
order that penalizes sanctuary jurisdictions have done so by be-
ginning with their factual concerns for protecting the city’s immi-
grant communities.320 And yet, as in the standing context, lawyers 
have grounded their constitutional claims in the preservation of 
the local government’s autonomy.321 As lawyers for the city of San 
Francisco put it, “The Executive Order is a severe invasion of San 
Francisco’s sovereignty”—not because the order encroaches on 
the city’s duties to protect its citizens, but rather because it “in-
terferes with [the city’s] ability to direct the official actions of its 
officers and employees.”322 Here, too, then, broadening our under-
standing of sovereignty could help shift the Court’s analytical 
focus from the abstract preservation of autonomy to the concrete 
question of individual rights—while at the same time potentially 
justifying the extension of sovereignty-based arguments from the 
state to lower levels of city and county governance. 
As this brief survey suggests, recognizing the history of state 
citizenship and corollary duties of state protection raises a host of 
normative and practical questions. What duties of protection 
should a modern state government owe to those within its bor-
ders? Should these duties of protection be based on modern con-
cepts of a duty as a legally enforceable right, or on the nineteenth-
century understandings of a moral obligation?323 Who, moreover, 
should enjoy these duties of protection? Should state citizenship 
 
acts of Congress; but we are clear that the right to do so does not arise here,” while ac-
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 322 San Francisco Complaint at *2 (cited in note 304). 
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be extended through ad hoc protections for those denied national 
citizenship, as in America’s founding century, or through formal 
legislative enactments? What types of individual rights ought the 
state to protect? And how, in the end, should these duties be ful-
filled and policed? 
Taken together, these questions present an opportunity to 
venture beyond the formal analytical categories that have defined 
the Court’s jurisprudence and the writing of America’s constitu-
tional history itself. By uncovering the intricacies of the time and 
place that helped give rise to the category of state citizenship as 
a protected status, this history thus invites us to reimagine not 
only the contours of America’s past, but also to broaden the scope 
of debate for the future, reminding us that a government’s sover-
eignty ultimately resides not simply in abstract appeals to its au-
tonomy or power, but rather in the protection of the fundamental 
rights of those who constitute it. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to explain a basic puzzle in American 
constitutional history: How and why did state citizenship become 
a strategic tool in America’s antislavery movement, before reap-
pearing in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due pro-
cess? While existing accounts have explained this puzzle as a suc-
cessful attempt by northerners to secure the rights of national 
citizenship for free people of color, this Article offers a different 
account. Drawing on long-overlooked evidence using a new inter-
disciplinary model of inquiry, it argues that the abolitionist turn 
to, and subsequent ascent of, state citizenship across the antebel-
lum era stemmed from a successful attempt to build an antislav-
ery coalition by reframing the issue of American slavery from the 
rights of a black person to the sovereignty of a free state. 
This neglected history of state citizenship in turn offers a new 
way of looking at the map of American constitutional history. It 
invites us to see the country’s founding century as one defined not 
by a nationalist North facing off against a states’-rights South, 
but rather as one defined by a kaleidoscopic continental interior 
of highly volatile jurisdictions, bound together in a flourishing do-
mestic economy rooted in race-based slavery. Surrounded by the 
grim realities of this geopolitical order, the country’s leading abo-
litionist lawyers quickly discovered the limits of older, inherited 
arguments premised on the rights of a black man as an American 
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citizen. Confronted with the imminent collapse of their move-
ment, these lawyers seized on the label of state citizenship in an 
attempt to build a movement premised on the sovereignty of a 
free state, as defined by its ability to protect its citizens from the 
plantations and chain gangs at the other end of the Atlantic trad-
ing corridor. 
Long hidden in the shadow of national citizenship, this his-
tory of state citizenship also provides us with an additional set of 
concepts with which to continue ongoing conversations over the 
role of the states in American constitutional governance. Perhaps 
most importantly, it invites us to broaden our current definition 
of state sovereignty from one predicated simply on the state’s de-
gree of autonomy from the national government to one that en-
compasses a state’s duty to protect its citizens. And in the end, 
it reminds us, once more, of the brutal, quotidian violence of 
America’s age of slavery: an age when those fighting for justice 
or power, or perhaps both, reached for the promise that in an 
America built on slavery, all states and their citizens were created 
equal. 
